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Labour's law?


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  • Jahn, Elke J.
  • Wagner, Thomas


A cross section analysis of 23 OECD members shows that there is an „antagonistic” relationship between the legal protection of investor interests on the one hand and labour interests on the other: the stronger the legal protection of investor rights in a country, the less developed are the individual and collective rights of labour and vice versa. A main cause for a country's position with respect to this trade off is its type of legal system, specifically whether it belongs to the common law or the civil law family. The established procedures of lawmaking and litigation in civil law countries decrease the organisation and influence costs of large interest groups, and increase their chances of institutionalising the income and protection goals of their members in the form of codified statutes. -- Eine Querschnittsanalyse der Rechtsordnungen von 23 Mitgliedern der OECD zeigt, dass eine „antagonistische“ Beziehung zwischen dem Schutz der Kapitalgeberinteressen (KI) auf der einen und der Arbeitnehmerinteressen (AI) auf der anderen Seite besteht: Je ausgeprägter der Schutz der KI in einem Land ist, desto schwächer ausgebildet sind die Individual- und die kollektiven Organisationsrechte der Arbeitnehmer und umgekehrt. Ein Grund für diese Tendenzen des Rechts scheint vom Grad der Autonomie des Rechtssystems und der Gewaltenteilung eines Landes bestimmt, speziell von seiner Zugehörigkeit zur Familie des Civil oder des Common Law. Die Verfahren der Rechtschöpfung und Rechtsprechung in den Civil Law Ländern senken die Kosten der Einführung regulierender Spezialgesetze ebenso wie die Organisations- und Einflusskosten großer Interessengruppen und erhöhen deren Chance, die Einkommens- und Schutzziele ihrer Mitglieder zu institutionalisieren.

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Paper provided by Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 6.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:faulre:6

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Keywords: Labour Law; Legal Origin; Separation of Powers; Industrial Relations;

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  1. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1978. "Adjudication as a Private Good," NBER Working Papers 0263, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Teulings,Coen & Hartog,Joop, 2008. "Corporatism or Competition?," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521049399, April.
  3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1999. "Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, and Reform," NBER Working Papers 7428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Riddell, W.C., 1993. "Unionization in Canada and the United States: A Tale of Two Countries," Papers 1993-1, Queen's at Kingston - Sch. of Indus. Relat. Papers in Industrial Relations.
  5. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 1996. "Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan," Public Economics 9603001, EconWPA.
  6. Bruce, Christopher J., 1988. "The adjudication of labor disputes as a private good," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 3-19, June.
  7. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
  8. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1999. "Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, Reform," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1883, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  9. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Legal Origins," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1920, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  10. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 7097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1999. "A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control," NBER Working Papers 7203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Robert J. Flanagan, 1999. "Macroeconomic Performance and Collective Bargaining: An International Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1150-1175, September.
  13. Masten, Scott E, 1988. "A Legal Basis for the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 181-98, Spring.
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Cited by:
  1. Niederalt, Michael, 2003. "Betriebliche Ausbildung als kollektives Phänomen," Discussion Papers 20, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
  2. Schank, Thorsten & Schnabel, Claus, 2004. "Betriebliche Determinanten des Überstundeneinsatzes," Discussion Papers 24, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
  3. Kohaut, Susanne & Schnabel, Claus, 2003. "Verbreitung, Ausmaß und Determinanten der übertariflichen Entlohnung," Discussion Papers 23, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.


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