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Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process

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Author Info
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
Bruno Deffains

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Abstract

There is extensive literature on whether courts or legislators produce efficient rules, but which of them produces rules efficiently? The law is subject touncertainty ex ante; uncertainty makes the outcomes of trials difficult to predict and deters parties from settling disputes out of court. In contrast, thelaw is certain ex post: litigation fosters the creation of precedents that reduce uncertainty. We postulate that there is a natural balance between the degree of uncertainty of a legal system (kept under control by litigation) and its litigation rate (sustained by uncertainty). We describe such equilibrium rates in a model of tort litigation, study how they are affected by different policies, and compare the costs and benefits of the legislative and the judicial process of lawmaking..

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 163 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 627-656
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Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200712)163:4_627:uolatl_2.0.tx_2-z

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
  22. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 273-281, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  25. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1996. "A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, January.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jalal EL OUARDIGHI & Rabija SOMUN-KAPETANOVIC, 2006. "Convergence des contributions aux inégalités de richesse dans le développement des pays européens," Working Papers of BETA 2006-19, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  2. Tapas K. Mishra, 2006. "A Further Look into the Demography-based GDP Forecasting Method," Working Papers of BETA 2006-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rachel Levy & Paul Muller, 2006. "Do academic laboratories correspond to scientific communities? Evidence from a large European university," Working Papers of BETA 2006-15, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  4. Frédéric Marty, 2007. "Incertitudes économiques et insécurité juridique : la notion de position dominante collective dans les politiques de concurrence européennes," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2007-20, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.


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