This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Andrew F. Daughety () (Department of Economics and Law School, Vanderbilt University)
Jennifer F. Reinganum () (Department of Economics and Law School, Vanderbilt University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases. Linkages between cases can arise due to exogenous factors such as correlated culpability or damages, or they can be generated by discretionary choices on the part of the litigants themselves or by legal doctrine and rules of procedure.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/wparchive/workpaper/vu05-w08.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2005
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University in its series Working Papers with number 0508.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0508

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Box 1819, Station B, Nashville, TN 37235
Fax: 615-343-8495
Email:
Web page: http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/econ/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diana Weymark).

Related research
Keywords: Multiple litigants; externalities; asymmetric information;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Feessa, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2000. "Settling multidefendant lawsuits under incomplete information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 295-313, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Spier, Kathryn E, 2003. " The Use of "Most-Favored-Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 78-95, Spring.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. repec:bep:eapcon:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1764-1764 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2008. "Holdouts In Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory Of Negotiation In A Weak Contractual Environment," CAMA Working Papers 2008-37, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  3. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007. "Mass Torts and the Incentives for Suit, Settlement, and Trial," Working Papers 0713, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A. & Van Velthoven, Ben C.J., 2006. "The introduction of an appeals court in Dutch tax litigation," MPRA Paper 2008, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Apr 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2006. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Working Papers of BETA 2006-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Che, Yeon-Koo & Spier, Kathryn, 2007. "Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," MPRA Paper 6104, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer, 2008. "Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and Screening," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can include your works in the database easily by uploading them on the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) if you do not have access to an institutional RePEc archive.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-14.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.