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Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining

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  • Andrew F. Daughety

    ()
    (Department of Economics and Law School, Vanderbilt University)

  • Jennifer F. Reinganum

    ()
    (Department of Economics and Law School, Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases. Linkages between cases can arise due to exogenous factors such as correlated culpability or damages, or they can be generated by discretionary choices on the part of the litigants themselves or by legal doctrine and rules of procedure.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu05-w08.pdf
File Function: First version, 2005
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0508.

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Date of creation: Apr 2005
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Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0508

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Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html

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Keywords: Multiple litigants; externalities; asymmetric information;

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References

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  1. Feessa, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2000. "Settling multidefendant lawsuits under incomplete information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 295-313, June.
  2. Spier, Kathryn E, 2003. " The Use of "Most-Favored-Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 78-95, Spring.
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Cited by:
  1. Bourjade, Sylvain & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul, 2009. "Private Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Pre-Trial Bargaining," TSE Working Papers 09-041, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  2. Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A. & van Velthoven, Ben C.J., 2009. "The introduction of an appeals court in Dutch tax litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 13-24, March.
  3. Choné, Philippe & Souam, Saïd & Vialfont, Arnold, 2014. "On the optimal use of commitment decisions under European competition law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 169-179.
  4. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2006. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Working Papers of BETA 2006-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  5. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2010. "Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment," NBER Working Papers 16632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Patrice Bougette & Christian Montet & Florent Venayre, 2006. "Jeux de négociation dans les affaires antitrust : engagements et transaction," Post-Print halshs-00476774, HAL.
  7. Che, Yeon-Koo & Spier, Kathryn, 2007. "Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," MPRA Paper 6104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Choné, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2010. "Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 271-288, November.
  9. Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2005. "Contributory Infringement Rule and Patents," Staff General Research Papers 12268, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  10. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007. "Mass Torts and the Incentives for Suit, Settlement, and Trial," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0713, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  11. Philippe Choné & Saïd Souam & Arnold Vialfont, 2012. "Commitments in Antitrust," EconomiX Working Papers 2012-9, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  12. Schwab, Christian & Tang, Hin-Yue Benny, 2011. "Die Steuerungswirkungen unterschiedlicher Prozesskostenregelungen: Ein Überblick zum Stand von Theorie und Empirie
    [The economic effects of alternative fee shifting rules: A review of the theoreti
    ," MPRA Paper 32746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2014. "Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 14-00006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

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