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Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer

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Author Info
Yeon-Koo Che
Kathryn E. Spier
Abstract

This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single defendant and N plaintiffs when there are fixed costs of litigation. When making simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to the plaintiffs, the defendant adopts a divide-and-conquer strategy. Plaintiffs settle their claims for less than they are jointly worth. The problem is worse when N is larger, the offers are sequential, and the plaintiffs make offers instead. Although divide-and-conquer strategies dilute the defendant's incentives, they increase the settlement rate and reduce litigation spending. Plaintiffs can raise their joint payoff through transfer payments, voting rules, and covenants not to accept discriminatory offers.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 164 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 4-23
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Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200803)164:1_4:eptsda_2.0.tx_2-g

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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This page was last updated on 2008-6-19.


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