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Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment

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  • Rohan Pitchford
  • Mark L. J. Wright

Abstract

Why is it difficult to restructure sovereign debt in a timely manner? In this paper we present a theory of the sovereign debt restructuring process in which delay arises as individual creditors hold-up a set- tlement in order to extract greater payments from the sovereign. We then use the theory to analyze recent policy proposals aimed at ensuring equal repayment of creditor claims. Strikingly, we show that such collective action policies may increase delay by encouraging free-riding on negotiation costs, even while preventing hold-up and reducing total negotiation costs. A calibrated version of the model can account for observed delays, and finds that free riding is quantitatively relevant: whereas in sim- ple low-cost debt restructuring operations collective mechanisms will reduce delay by more than 60%, in high-cost complicated restructurings the adoption of such mechanisms results in a doubling of delay.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 16632.

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Date of creation: Dec 2010
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Publication status: published as Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2012. "Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 812-837.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16632

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Marcos Chamon & Ran Bi, 2011. "The Problem that Wasn't," IMF Working Papers 11/265, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 247-272, 05.
  3. Demian Pouzo & Ignacio Presno, 2012. "Sovereign default risk and uncertainty premia," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 12-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  4. Sayantan Ghosal & Marcus Miller & Kannika Thampanishvong, 2010. "Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt: Recovery and Sustainability," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews 201004, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
  5. Das, Udaibir S. & Papaioannou, Michael G. & Trebesch, Christoph, . "Sovereign Default Risk and Private Sector Access to Capital in Emerging Markets," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Yan Bai & Jing Zhang, 2009. "Duration of Sovereign Debt Renegotiation," Working Papers, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan 593, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  7. Ugo Panizza, 2013. "Do We Need a Mechanism for Solving Sovereign Debt Crises? A Rule-Based Discussion," IHEID Working Papers, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies 03-2013, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
  8. Ghosal, Sayantan & Miller, Marcus & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2010. "Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt: Recovery and Sustainability," SIRE Discussion Papers, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) 2010-100, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  9. Christoph Trebesch & Michael G Papaioannou & Udaibir S. Das, 2012. "Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010," IMF Working Papers 12/203, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Ignacio Presno & Demian Pouzo, 2012. "Sovereign Default Risk and Uncertainty Premia," 2012 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 608, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  11. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2013. "On the contribution of game theory to the study of sovereign debt and default," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 649-667, WINTER.

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