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Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default

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  • Michael Tomz
  • Mark L. J. Wright

Abstract

In this essay we review the empirical literature about sovereign debt and default. As we survey the work of economists, historians, and political scientists, we also emphasize parallel developments by theorists and recommend steps to improve the correspondence between theory and data.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 18855.

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Date of creation: Feb 2013
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Publication status: published as Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 247-272, 05.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18855

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Cited by:
  1. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, 2013. "The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy," CESifo Working Paper Series 4333, CESifo Group Munich.

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