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Noneconomic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties

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  • ANDREW K. ROSE
  • MARK M. SPIEGEL

Abstract

We examine the role of noneconomic partnerships in promoting international economic exchange. Since far-sighted countries are more willing to join costly international partnerships such as environmental treaties, environmental engagement tends to encourage international lending. Countries with such noneconomic partnerships also find it easier to engage in economic exchanges since they face the possibility that debt default might also spill over to hinder their noneconomic relationships. We present a theoretical model of these ideas and then verify their empirical importance using a bilateral cross-section of data on international cross-holdings of assets and environmental treaties. Our results support the notion that international environmental cooperation facilitates economic exchange. Copyright (c) 2009 The Ohio State University.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 41 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (03)
Pages: 337-363

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Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:41:y:2009:i:2-3:p:337-363

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879

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