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A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt

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  • Bulow, Jeremy
  • Rogoff, Kenneth

Abstract

The authors present a dynamic model of international lending in whi ch borrowers cannot commit to future repayments and debtors can sometime s successfully negotiate partial defaults or "rescheduling agreements." All parties in a debt rescheduling negotiation realize that today's rescheduling agreement may itself have to be renegotiated in the future. The authors' bargaining-theoretic approach allows them to handle the effects of uncertainty on sovereign debt contracts in a much more satisfactory way than in earlier analyses. The framework is readily extended to analyze the conflicting interests of different lenders, and of banks and creditor-country taxpayers. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 97 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 155-78

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:1:p:155-78

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  1. Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October.
  2. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "The Pure Theory of Country Risk," NBER Working Papers 1894, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. repec:imf:imfocp:43 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Edwards, Sebastian, 1986. "The pricing of bonds and bank loans in international markets : An empirical analysis of developing countries' foreign borrowing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 565-589, June.
  5. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
  6. Daniel Cohen & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991. "Growth and External Debt Under Risk of Debt Repudiation," NBER Chapters, in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 437-472 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  8. Dixit, Avinash, 1987. " Issues of Strategic Trade Policy for Small Countries," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(3), pages 349-67.
  9. Steven C. Kyle & Jeffrey Sachs, 1984. "Developing Country Debt and the Market Value of Large Commercial Banks," NBER Working Papers 1470, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  1. The science of haircuts
    by Olaf Storbeck in Economics Intelligence on 2011-07-19 08:16:34
  2. Greece: Can’t Pay/Won’t Pay? by Mark Harrison
    by Mark Harrison in Mark Harrison's blog on 2012-05-23 16:54:58
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