Three game theoretic issues of international trade and commercial policy are examined fro m the special perspective of small countries. In oligopolistic market s, the question is when their ability to remain credibly small player s can be an advantage. In negotiations about trade regimes, small cou ntries' gains from various kinds of trade are analyzed, and their abi lity to achieve a better outcome by being more patient is considered. The formation of alliances is briefly examined, where small countrie s can gain if they can become free riders or pivotal voters. Copyright 1987 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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