Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?
AbstractInternational lending to a less-developed country cannot be based on the debtor's reputation for making repayments. That is, loans to LDCs will not be made or repaid unless foreign creditors have legal or other direct sanctions they can exercise against a sovereign debtor who defaults Even if some lending is feasible because of direct sanctions, having a reputation for repayment in no way enhances a small LDC's ability to borrow.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm - International Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 411.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF STOCKHOLM, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES, S- 106 91 STOCKHOLM SWEDEN.
Web page: http://www.iies.su.se/
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public debt ; foreign trade ; incentives;
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- Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989.
"A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February.
- Jeremy A.Rogoff Bulow & Kenneth, 1986. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 43, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," NBER Working Papers 2088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1986.
"The pure theory of country risk,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 481-513, June.
- Maurice Obstfeld, 1986.
"Capital Mobility in the World Economy: Theory and Measurement,"
NBER Working Papers
1692, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986. "Capital mobility in the world economy: Theory and measurement," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 55-103, January.
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999.
"Reputation and Imperfect Information,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
238, David K. Levine.
- Kletzer, Kenneth M, 1984. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 287-307, June.
- Peter H. Lindert & Peter J. Morton, 1989.
"How Sovereign Debt Has Worked,"
in: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1: The International Financial System, pages 39-106
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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