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Contingent Loan Repayment in the Philippines

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  • Marcel Fafchamps
  • Flore Gubert

Abstract

Using data from the Philippines, this paper seeks to understand how households in the study area apparently manage to avoid falling in a debt trap in spite of frequent borrowing. Findings suggest this is achieved via three institutional features. First, most informal debt carries no interest. As we show in the conceptual section, charging zero interest makes a debt trap impossible. Second, for all debts, repayment is postponed in case of borrower`s difficulty; this is the only insurance feature of debt repayment. Third, while debt principal is seldom forgiven or reduced, interest-bearing debt does not carry additional interest if debt repayment is delayed. This prevents interest charges from accumulating and debt from snowballing.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 215.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:215

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Keywords: Debt Repayment; Informal Credit; Risk Sharing; Labor Bonding;

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Cited by:
  1. Gubert, Flore & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2007. "The Formation of Risk Sharing Networks," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4392, Paris Dauphine University.
  2. Landmann, Andreas & Vollan, Björn & Frölich, Markus, 2011. "Saving, Microinsurance: Why You Should Do Both or Nothing. A Behavioral Experiment on the Philippines," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 51, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
  3. Marie Godquin & Manohar Sharma, 2005. "If only I could borrow more! Production and consumption credit constraints in the Philippines," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) bla05008, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

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