Springer
Constitutional Political Economy
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Editor: Dennis C. Mueller
Editor: Peter C. Ordeshook
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2013, Volume 24, Issue 1
- 1-1 On the editorial transition
by Roger Congleton & Stefan Voigt - 2-18 A framework for the study of firms as constitutional orders
by Anthony Evans & Nikolai Wenzel - 19-42 On the problem of scale: Hayek, Kohr, Jacobs and the reinvention of the political state
by Benjamen Gussen - 43-56 Veto players and foreign aid provision
by Yu Wang & Shuai Jin - 57-85 Islamic constitutionalism and rule of law: a constitutional economics perspective
by Moamen Gouda
2012, Volume 23, Issue 4
- 279-301 New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity
by Karsten Mause & Friedrich Groeteke - 302-336 Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization
by Alexander Libman - 337-356 The political economy of civil society
by Adrian Pabst & Roberto Scazzieri - 357-379 State capitalism and the rent-seeking conjecture
by Paul Aligica & Vlad Tarko
2012, Volume 23, Issue 3
- 181-181 Introductory note and acknowledgements
by Giuseppe Eusepi & Richard Wagner - 182-198 The political economy of public debt
by Geoffrey Brennan - 199-212 Indebted state versus intermediary state: who owes what to whom?
by Giuseppe Eusepi & Richard Wagner - 213-243 Do departures from democratic accountability compromise the stability of public finances? Keynesianism, central banking, and minority governments in the Canadian system of party government, 1867–2009
by J. Ferris & Stanley Winer & Bernard Grofman - 244-260 A comparative analysis of the voting behavior of constituents and their representatives for public debts
by Reiner Eichenberger & David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann - 261-277 Rationality, political economy, and fiscal responsibility: wrestling with tragedy on the fiscal commons
by Richard Wagner
2012, Volume 23, Issue 2
- 95-133 Economic freedom and growth. Which policies matter the most?
by Martin Rode & Sebastian Coll - 134-165 Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states
by George Crowley - 166-180 Ethnic segregation and the quality of government: the importance of regional diversity
by Andreas Kyriacou
2012, Volume 23, Issue 1
- 1-21 Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the rationality of selection to office by lot
by George Tridimas - 22-44 Agenda control in an unstable multiparty parliamentary democracy: evidence from the Israeli public sector
by Maoz Rosenthal - 45-65 Designing the institutions of international liberalism: some contributions from the interwar period
by Fabio Masini - 66-93 Credible commitments and constitutional constraints: state debt repudiation and default in nineteenth century America
by John Dove
2011, Volume 22, Issue 4
- 303-324 Minimizing the losers: regime satisfaction in multi-level systems
by Katharina Holzinger & Andrea Schneider & Klaus Zimmermann - 325-354 The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration
by Barbara Dluhosch & Nikolai Ziegler - 355-372 Decentralization, agency costs, and the new economic constitution of China
by Eric Ip & Michael Law - 373-397 Contractual preferences and moral biases: social identity and procedural fairness in the exclusion game experiment
by Timo Tammi
2011, Volume 22, Issue 3
- 203-220 Political exchange and the voting franchise: universal democracy as an emergent process
by Jeremy Horpedahl - 221-237 The political economy of constitutional restraints
by Dimitrios Xefteris - 238-264 Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators
by Lorenz Blume & Stefan Voigt - 265-286 The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures
by Gregory Randolph - 287-301 Information and political failures: to what extent does rational ignorance explain irrational beliefs formation?
by Louis Jaeck
2011, Volume 22, Issue 2
- 103-121 Informal accountability, credible actions, and democratization in Taiwan
by O. Yap - 122-140 Shock therapy and the transfer of institutions: the new debate and some lessons from the post-1806 reforms in Prussia and in southwestern Germany
by Joachim Zweynert - 141-172 Making executive politics mutually productive and fair
by T. Durant - 173-190 Under what conditions may social contracts arise? Evidence from the Hanseatic League
by Alexander Fink - 191-197 Federalism and exit costs
by Gebhard Kirchgässner & Mark Schelker - 198-199 Federalism and individual liberty: a rejoinder
by C. Mantzavinos - 200-202 Vernon Smith, Rationality in economics: constructivist and ecological forms
by Maria Paganelli
2011, Volume 22, Issue 1
- 1-20 Liberal constitutionalism, constitutional liberalism and democracy
by Viktor Vanberg - 21-57 Enfranchisement from a political perspective
by Soumyanetra Munshi - 58-82 A political economy perspective of direct democracy in ancient Athens
by George Tridimas - 83-102 A tale of two federalisms: Germany, the United States and the ubiquity of centralization
by Thomas Döring & Jan Schnellenbach
2010, Volume 21, Issue 4
- 309-335 Supranational integration and national reorganization: On the Maastricht treaty’s impact on fiscal decentralization in EU countries
by Thushyanthan Baskaran - 336-359 Parliament vs. Supreme court: a veto player framework of the Indian constitutional experiment in the area of economic and civil rights
by Feler Bose - 360-373 The problem of political calculation in autocracies
by Sherzod Abdukadirov - 374-406 The political economy of expulsion: the regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England
by Mark Koyama - 407-413 Gerald Berk: Louis D. Brandeis and the making of regulated competition, 1900–1932
by Richard Adelstein
2010, Volume 21, Issue 3
- 207-230 Institutions and human development in the Latin American informal economy
by Roberto Dell’Anno - 231-248 Regulation and shadow economy: empirical evidence for 25 OECD-countries
by Dominik Enste - 249-269 Explaining constitution-makers’ preferences: the cases of Estonia and the United States
by Ringa Raudla - 270-287 Understanding economic change: the impact of emotion
by Roberta Patalano - 288-307 Out of a slave contract: the analysis of pre-Hobbesian anarchists in the Old Testament
by Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto
2010, Volume 21, Issue 2
- 101-118 Federalism and individual liberty
by C. Mantzavinos - 119-144 Referendum and the choice between monarchy and republic in Greece
by George Tridimas - 145-170 Is H.A. Simon a theoretician of decentralized planning? A comparison with F.A. Hayek on planning, market, and organizations
by Stefano Fiori - 171-201 Conformity, reciprocity and the sense of justice. How social contract-based preferences and beliefs explain norm compliance: the experimental evidence
by Lorenzo Sacconi & Marco Faillo - 202-205 Marion Fourcade: Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain, and France, 1890s to 1990s
by Philippe Fontaine
2010, Volume 21, Issue 1
- 1-27 The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum
by Mwangi Kimenyi & William Shughart - 28-49 The ‘science-as-market’ analogy: a constitutional economics perspective
by Viktor Vanberg - 50-79 An index of political support for decentralization: the Spanish case
by Juan Molero & Isabel Rodríguez-Tejedo - 80-96 Relationships among democratic freedoms in the former Soviet Republics: a causality analysis
by Jac Heckelman - 97-99 Vernon L. Smith: Discovery—A Memoir
by E. Roy Weintraub
2009, Volume 20, Issue 3
- 197-201 Separation of powers: new perspectives and empirical findings—introduction
by Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt - 202-229 Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?
by José Cheibub & Svitlana Chernykh - 230-250 The time-varying independence of Italian peak judicial institutions
by Fabio Padovano - 251-266 Some thoughts about referendums, representative democracy, and separation of powers
by Simon Hug - 267-295 Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?
by Marc Quintyn - 296-322 Independent electoral management bodies and international election observer missions: any impact on the observed level of democracy? A conceptual framework
by Anne Aaken - 323-340 International delegation and state disaggregation
by Tom Ginsburg - 341-365 Why risk popular ratification failure? A comparative analysis of the choice of the ratification instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU
by Daniel Finke & Thomas König - 366-387 Toward global checks and balances
by Eyal Benvenisti & George Downs
2009, Volume 20, Issue 2
- 99-117 The politics of constitutional amendment in postcommunist Europe
by Andrew Roberts - 118-138 Constitutional moments in Eastern Europe and subjectivist political economy
by Anthony Evans - 139-159 Choosing one’s own informal institutions: on Hayek’s critique of Keynes’s immoralism
by Niclas Berggren - 160-176 Why did the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapse? A public choice perspective
by Dalibor Roháč - 177-192 Constitutional tariffs, incidental protection, and the Laffer relationship in the early United States
by Phillip Magness - 193-196 Steven M. Teles: The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law
by Richard Adelstein
2009, Volume 20, Issue 1
- 1-41 Constitutions and economic reforms in transition: an empirical study
by Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska - 42-56 Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics
by Alain Marciano - 57-70 From scholarly idea to budgetary institution: the emergence of cost-benefit analysis
by Michael Makowsky & Richard Wagner - 71-93 Do authoritarian institutions mobilize economic cooperation?
by Abel Escribà-Folch - 94-97 Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine: Against Intellectual Property
by F. Scherer
2008, Volume 19, Issue 4
- 277-300 The foundations of constitutionalism: an analysis of debaathification
by Jens Meierhenrich - 301-312 Political entrepreneurs and electoral capital: the case of the Israeli State Economy Arrangement Law
by Assaf Meydani - 313-355 The origins and evolution of democracy: an exercise in history from a constitutional economics approach
by Sebastian Coll - 356-360 Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness
by Thomas Leonard - 361-367 Margaret Schabas: The Natural Origins of Economics
by David Levy
2008, Volume 19, Issue 3
- 169-170 Editorial introduction
by Alan Hamlin - 171-179 Same players, different game: how better rules make better politics
by James Buchanan - 180-202 Deliberation, learning, and institutional change: the evolution of institutions in judicial settings
by William Blomquist & Elinor Ostrom - 203-225 Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?
by Ulrich Witt & Christian Schubert - 226-248 Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism
by Robert Sugden - 249-260 Regulation and revenue
by Geoffrey Brennan & Hartmut Kliemt - 261-276 Social Market Economy: origins, meanings and interpretations
by Nils Goldschmidt & Michael Wohlgemuth
2008, Volume 19, Issue 2
- 81-93 Direct democracy: obstacle to reform?
by Gebhard Kirchgässner - 94-110 An institutional analysis of voter turnout: the role of primary type and the expressive and instrumental voting hypotheses
by Peter Calcagno & Christopher Westley - 111-128 The unanimity rule and religious fractionalisation in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic
by Dalibor Roháč - 129-147 Institutional change from an evolutionary perspective: the Mexican experience
by Antonio Saravia - 148-157 Liberty and national security in Adam Smith’s possible world
by Mark Jackson - 158-164 Robert H. Frank, Falling behind: how rising inequality harms the middle class
by Thomas Leonard - 165-168 James R. Hackney, Jr., Under cover of science: American legal-economic theory and the quest for objectivity
by Alain Marciano
2008, Volume 19, Issue 1
- 1-1 Editorial Announcement
by Alan Hamlin & Dennis Mueller & Peter Ordeshook - 3-18 Discussion, construction and evolution: Mill, Buchanan and Hayek on the constitutional order
by Sandra Peart & David Levy - 19-33 The exchange paradigm of constitutional economics: implications for understanding the third sector
by Vladislav Valentinov - 35-59 America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective
by Roger Congleton - 61-80 Taxonomy: racism versus fiscal conservatism in voting on segregationist provisions in Alabama’s constitution
by Michael Reksulak & William Shughart
2007, Volume 18, Issue 4
- 223-241 Imagination and society. The affective side of institutions
by Roberta Patalano - 243-285 The interrelations between legal and economic processes: a consideration of the reactions
by Warren Samuels - 287-299 Rawls’ Paradox
by Jason Brennan - 301-318 Buchanan on monetary constitutions
by Domenico D’Amico - 319-323 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
by Peter Boettke - 325-328 Clifford Winston, Government Failure versus Market Failure
by Bryan Caplan
2007, Volume 18, Issue 3
- 145-159 On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs
by Roger Congleton - 161-176 Conceptions of property rights and norms
by Derek Yonai - 177-197 Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988
by Gary Reich - 199-222 Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics
by Viktor Vanberg
2007, Volume 18, Issue 2
- 69-82 On the evaluation of power in parliaments and government formation
by Nicolas Andjiga & Daoud Badirou & Boniface Mbih - 83-97 Voting on voting with the feet: a cross-county analysis of the Tennessee popular referenda to secede from the union
by Jac Heckelman & John Dinan - 99-106 The European Union: confederation, federation or association of compound states?
by Charles Blankart - 107-126 Institutional changes and shifting ideas: a constitutional analysis of the Euro
by Maurizio Mistri - 127-143 Saving government failure theory from itself: recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective
by Peter Boettke & Christopher Coyne & Peter Leeson
2007, Volume 18, Issue 1
- 1-20 Constitutional choice and European immigration policy
by Gabriele Orcalli - 21-34 The electoral college: diversification and the election process
by Chris Cain & Peter Basciano & Ellen Cain - 35-62 Toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract
by Christian Cordes & Christian Schubert - 63-68 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions
by Dennis Mueller
2006, Volume 17, Issue 4
- 237-249 Partially sighted persons and the public debt elephant
by John Considine & David Duffy - 251-276 Lawyers and politicians: the impact of organized legal professions on institutional reforms
by Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell - 277-301 Between European integration and regional autonomy: the case of Italy from an economic perspective
by Marco Montanari - 303-324 Separation of powers and the erosion of the ‘right to property’ in India
by Jaivir Singh
2006, Volume 17, Issue 3
- 133-163 Reciprocity and the hidden constitution of world trade
by Carsten Herrmann-Pillath - 165-187 Legislative output and the Constitutional Court in Italy
by Michele Santoni & Francesco Zucchini - 189-205 Germany and Italy: conflicting policy paradigms towards European monetary integration?
by Ivo Maes & Lucia Quaglia - 207-216 Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members
by Pierre-Guillaume Méon - 217-235 Legal positivism and property rights: a critique of Hayek and Peczenik
by Niclas Berggren
2006, Volume 17, Issue 2
- 71-85 Constitutional Interpretation: Burke and Buchanan and their 18th Century Intellectual Roots
by John Considine - 87-101 Deficits and Divided Governments: The Case of the German ‘Bundesrat’
by Peter Schwarz - 103-115 The Political Foundations of Development: The Case of Botswana
by Scott Beaulier & J. Subrick - 117-132 Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan
by Jan Schnellenbach
2006, Volume 17, Issue 1
- 5-13 The Effects of Issue Salience on Political Decision-making
by Torsten Selck - 15-29 “Deja Vu All Over Again:” Constitutional Economics and European legal Integration
by Nathan Griffith - 31-48 Reflections on the Origins of the Polis
by Carl Lyttkens - 49-61 The emergence of institutions in Hayek’s theory: two views or one?
by Stefano Fiori - 63-66 Review
by Thomas Leonard
2005, Volume 16, Issue 4
- 327-346 Constitutional Foundations of Economic Freedom: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis
by Xavier Vanssay & Vincent Hildebrand & Zane Spindler - 347-368 Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
by Cindy Skach - 369-386 The Powers of The Central Governments and the Problems of Enlarging and Deepening the European Union: An Essay of Constitutional Political Economy
by J. Faíña-Medín & Antonio García-Lorenzo & Jesús López-Rodríguez - 387-395 Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition
by Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi
2005, Volume 16, Issue 3
- 227-247 Hayek Reads the Literature on the Emergence of Norms
by Luciano Andreozzi - 249-276 The Constitution of the Not-For-Profit Organisation: Reciprocal Conformity to Morality
by Gianluca Grimalda & Lorenzo Sacconi - 277-284 Liberty and Economic Growth in Adam Smith’s Possible World
by Mark Jackson - 285-311 The Common Law Character of English Charters: Spontaneous Order in the Constitutions of Clarendon (1164)
by Robert Mulligan - 313-317 Book Review: S TEVEN D. L EVITT and S TEPHEN J. D UBNER (2005) Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything. New York: WilliamMorrow. 242 pp., $25.95
by Thomas Leonard
2005, Volume 16, Issue 2
- 93-111 Riker and Federalism
by Mikhail Filippov - 125-141 Mass-Elite Equilibrium of Federal Constitutional Legitimacy
by Olga Shvetsova - 143-159 Pawns Take Queen: The Destabilizing Effects of Regional Parties in Europe
by Dawn Brancati - 161-188 Decentralized Governance, Constitution Formation, and Redistribution
by Erik Wibbels - 189-205 Federalism as a Public Good
by Jenna Bednar - 207-219 “The Myth of Ownership” Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel
by Geoffrey Brennan
2005, Volume 16, Issue 1
- 5-30 Judges and Taxes: Judicial Review, Judicial Independence and the Size of Government
by George Tridmas - 31-48 Postwar Reconstruction: Some Insights from Public Choice and Institutional Economics
by Tyler Cowen & Christopher Coyne - 49-69 Addressing Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa: Institutions and Agency
by Omotunde Johnson - 71-83 Credible Currency: A Constitutional Perspective
by George Selgin & Lawrence White
2004, Volume 15, Issue 4
- 315-338 Colonization and the Rule of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Common Law and Civil Law Countries
by Sandra Joireman - 339-358 Political Learning: The Neglected Precondition of Constitutional Reform
by Gerhard Wegner - 359-370 A Theoretical Basis for the Consideration of Spending Thresholds in the Analysis of Fiscal Referendums
by Marc-Jean Martin - 371-381 Vertical and Horizontal Trust Networks in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Third Reich
by Franklin Mixon & W. Charles Sawyer & Len Treviño - 383-389 Vetoes Overridable by Simple Majorities
by Thomas Schwartz
2004, Volume 15, Issue 3
- 223-237 The Invisible Hand of James Madison
by David Prindle - 239-259 Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies
by Kjell Hausken & Christian W. Martin & Thomas Plümper - 261-280 The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch -- A Conceptual Framework
by Anne Van Aaken & Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt - 281-304 Federalism and Conflicts over Principalship. Some Insights into the American Constitutional History
by Jean-Michael Josselin & Alain Marciano - 305-307 Review: Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner (eds.) (2001) Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 351 pp., $39.00 (hardcover), $20.00 (paperback)
by Thomas C. Schelling
2004, Volume 15, Issue 2
- 127-132 An Introduction to the Status Quo
by Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin - 133-144 The Status of the Status Quo
by James M. Buchanan - 145-151 Can We Know the Status Quo?
by Roger L. Faith - 153-170 The Status Quo in Contractarian-Constitutionalist Perspective
by Viktor J. Vanberg - 171-185 Contractarianism as Liberal Conservatism: Buchanan's Unfinished Philosophical Agenda
by Hartmut Kliemt - 187-204 On Political Competition: Democracy, Opinion and Responsibility
by Mark S. Peacock - 205-213 Review
by Dennis C. Mueller
2004, Volume 15, Issue 1
- 3-25 Fiscal Constitutions
by Hans Gersbach - 27-76 The Optimal Decentralisation of Government Activity: Normative Recommendations for the European Constitution
by Fritz Breuss & Markus Eller - 77-88 Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy
by Eric Crampton & Andrew Farrant - 89-107 Constitutions for Local Collective Action and Institutional Interdependence
by Stefano Solari
2003, Volume 14, Issue 4
- 263-285 Mixed Motives: An Empirical Analysis of ILO Roll-Call Voting
by Bernhard Boockmann - 287-299 The Core, Transaction Costs, and the Coase Theorem
by Varouj Aivazian & Jeffrey Callen - 301-317 Procedural Rationality and Institutions: The Production of Norms by Means of Norms
by Maurizio Mistri - 319-333 The Independence of the Italian Constitutional Court
by Albert Breton & Angela Fraschini - 335-338 Hayek Contra Pangloss: A Rejoinder
by Douglas Whitman - 339-341 Reviews
by Tyler Cowen - 343-346 Reviews
by Steven Medema
2003, Volume 14, Issue 3
- 167-190 A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement
by Roger Congleton & Andreas Kyriacou & Jordi Bacaria - 191-212 Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects
by Olga Shvetsova - 213-233 Cognitive Rules, Institutions, and Competition
by Oliver Budzinski - 235-251 European Monetary Integration and the ‘Constitutionalization’ of Macroeconomic Policy Making
by Lucia Quaglia - 253-258 Review
by Robert Frank
2003, Volume 14, Issue 2
- 83-94 The Disunity of Unanimity
by Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi - 95-105 Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited
by Zane Spindler & Xavier De Vanssay - 107-118 The Tax Man Cometh: Constitutional Principles for Tax Enforcement
by Daniel Sutter & Lee Coppock - 119-140 Tax Morale, Rule-Governed Behaviour and Trust
by Benno Torgler - 141-154 A Constitutional Interpretation of the GATT/WTO
by Gabriele Orcalli