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Stable Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Wesley H. Holliday

    (University of California)

  • Eric Pacuit

    (University of Maryland)

Abstract

We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election with B included (unless there is another candidate $$A'$$ A ′ who has the same kind of claim to winning, in which case a tiebreaker may choose between such candidates). We call this principle Stability for Winners (with Tiebreaking). Stable Voting satisfies this principle while also having a remarkable ability to avoid tied outcomes in elections even with small numbers of voters.

Suggested Citation

  • Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2023. "Stable Voting," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 421-433, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:34:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-022-09383-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09383-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers," Papers 2004.02350, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    2. Markus Schulze, 2011. "A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 267-303, February.
    3. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2023. "Split Cycle: a new Condorcet-consistent voting method independent of clones and immune to spoilers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 1-62, October.
    4. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2021. "Axioms for defeat in democratic elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 475-524, October.
    5. Bordes, Georges, 1983. "On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 122-132, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting systems; Ranked ballots; Condorcet winner;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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