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Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers

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  • Wesley H. Holliday
  • Eric Pacuit

Abstract

We propose a Condorcet consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying the anti-vote-splitting criterion of independence of clones. In this family, only Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers, which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and negative involvement, which concern adding voters to elections. Thus, in contrast to other clone-independent methods, Split Cycle mitigates both "spoiler effects" and "strong no show paradoxes."

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  • Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers," Papers 2004.02350, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2004.02350
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2023. "Stable Voting," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 421-433, September.

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