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How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?

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  • Florenz Plassmann

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  • T. Tideman

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    Abstract

    We estimate the frequencies with which ten voting anomalies (ties and nine voting paradoxes) occur under 14 voting rules, using a statistical model that simulates voting situations that follow the same distribution as voting situations in actual elections. Thus the frequencies that we estimate from our simulated data are likely to be very close to the frequencies that would be observed in actual three-candidate elections. We find that two Condorcet-consistent voting rules do, the Black rule and the Nanson rule, encounter most paradoxes and ties less frequently than the other rules do, especially in elections with few voters. The Bucklin rule, the Plurality rule, and the Anti-plurality rule tend to perform worse than the other eleven rules, especially when the number of voters becomes large. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

    Volume (Year): 42 (2014)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 31-75

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:42:y:2014:i:1:p:31-75

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    1. Marc Henry & Ismael Mourifié, 2011. "Euclidean Revealed Preferences: Testing the Spatial Voting Model," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-49, CIRANO.
    2. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
    3. Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin, 2001. "Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 53-80.
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