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And the loser is... Plurality Voting

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  • Jean-François Laslier

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

Abstract

This paper reports on a vote for choosing the best voting rules that was organized among the participants of the Voting Procedures workshop in July, 2010. Among 18 voting rules, Approval Voting won the contest, and Plurality Voting received no support at all.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00609810.

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Date of creation: 20 Jul 2011
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00609810

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  1. Simpson, Paul B, 1969. "On Defining Areas of Voter Choice: Professor Tullock on Stable Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 478-90, August.
  2. B. Dutta & J-F. Laslier, 1998. "Comparison functions and choice correspondences," THEMA Working Papers 98-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  3. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jean-François Laslier, 1996. "Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 75-93, January.
  4. André Blais & Simon Labbé-St-Vincent & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2008. "Vote choice in one round and two round elections," Working Papers hal-00335060, HAL.
  5. Laffond G. & Laslier J. F. & Le Breton M., 1993. "The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 182-201, January.
  6. Gehrlein, William V & Lepelley, Dominique, 2003. " On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 177-90, October.
  7. Jean-François Laslier & Karine Van-Der-Straeten, 2003. "Election présidentielle : Une expérience pour un autre mode de scrutin," Working Papers hal-00242952, HAL.
  8. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "A note on choosing the alternative with the best median evaluation," Working Papers hal-00397403, HAL.
  9. DHILLON, Amrita & MERTENS, Jean-François, 1993. "Relative Utilitarianism," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1993048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. John Duggan, 2007. "A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 491-506, April.
  11. Bassett, Gilbert W, Jr & Persky, Joseph, 1999. " Robust Voting," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 99(3-4), pages 299-310, June.
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