Satisfaction approval voting
AbstractWe propose a new voting system, satisfaction approval voting (SAV), for multiwinner elections, in which voters can approve of as many candidates or as many parties as they like. However, the winners are not those who receive the most votes, as under approval voting (AV), but those who maximize the sum of the satisfaction scores of all voters, where a voter’s satisfaction score is the fraction of his or her approved candidates who are elected. SAV may give a different outcome from A--in fact, SAV and AV outcomes may be disjoint—but SAV generally chooses candidates representing more diverse interests than does AV (this is demonstrated empirically in the case of a recent election of the Game Theory Society). A decision-theoretic analysis shows that all strategies except approving of a least-preferred candidate are undominated, so voters will often find it optimal to approve of more than one candidate. In party-list systems, SAV apportions seats to parties according to the Jefferson/d’Hondt method with a quota constraint, which favors large parties and gives an incentive to smaller parties to coordinate their policies and forge alliances, even before an election, that reflect their supporters’ coalitional preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 22709.
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision:
multiwinner election; voting system; approval ballot; proportional representation; apportonment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-05-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2010-05-22 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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