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Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany

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  • Carlos Alós-Ferrer

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  • Ðura-Georg Granić

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-011-0550-5
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 39 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 171-205

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:1:p:171-205

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References

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  1. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
  2. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
  3. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
  4. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
  5. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2009. "Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation le 22 avril 2007. Premiers résultats," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 60(1), pages 189-201.
  6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  7. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
  8. Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2010. "Satisfaction approval voting," MPRA Paper 22709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2001. "A nail-biting election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 409-414.
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Cited by:
  1. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsat, 2011. "Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1103, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
  2. Alcantud, José Carlos R. & de Andres Calle, Rocio & Cascon, José Manuel, 2012. "Approval consensus measures," MPRA Paper 39610, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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