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A note on choosing the alternative with the best median evaluation

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  • Jean-François Laslier

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

Abstract

The voting rule proposed by Basset and Persky (Public Choice 99: 299-310) picks the alternative with best median evaluation. The present note shows that this MaxMed principle is equivalent to ask the social planner to apply the MaxMin principle allowing him to discard half of the population. In one-dimensional, single-peaked domains, the paper compares this rule with majority rule and the utilitarian criterion. The MaxMed outcome is rejected by a majority of voters in favor of outcomes which are also utilitarian improvements.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00397403.

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Date of creation: 22 Jun 2009
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00397403

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00397403/en/
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Cited by:
  1. Jean-François Laslier, 2011. "And the loser is... Plurality Voting," Working Papers hal-00609810, HAL.

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