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Framed-field experiments on approval voting in political contexts. Some teachings

Author

Listed:
  • Antoinette Baujard

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Herrade Igersheim

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper presents findings from framed field experiments on Approval Voting that took place during the 2002 and 2007 French presidential elections. We describe the experimental designs and the main results. Various lessons are drawn from the experiments: (i) Further such experiments are feasible, and the previous ones were very well received by voters; (ii) The principle of approval voting is easily understood and accepted; (iii) Within the observed political context, approval voting modifies the overall ranking of candidates compared to the official first round voting method, and, further, it is shown that different voting rules may yield different outcomes; (iv) lastly, we review various interesting findings that research programs have derived from deeper analysis of the data collected.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2010. "Framed-field experiments on approval voting in political contexts. Some teachings," Post-Print halshs-00512525, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00512525
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_15
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Dehez & Victor Ginsburgh, 2020. "Approval voting and Shapley ranking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 415-428, September.
    2. Jean-François Laslier, 2011. "And the loser is... Plurality Voting," Working Papers hal-00609810, HAL.

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