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A general scoring rule

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  • Gaertner, Wulf
  • Xu, Yongsheng

Abstract

This paper studies a ranking rule of the following type axiomatically: each voter places k candidates into n categories with ranks from n to 1 attached to these categories, the candidate(s) with the highest aggregate score is (are) the winner(s). We show that it is characterized by a monotonicity condition and a multi-stage cancellation property.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 63 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 193-196

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:3:p:193-196

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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References

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  1. Uzi Segal, 2000. "Let's Agree That All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 569-589, June.
  2. Maskin, Eric, 1978. "A Theorem on Utilitarianism," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 93-96, February.
  3. DHILLON, Amrita & MERTENS, Jean-François, . "Relative utilitarianism," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1398, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
  5. Bassett, Gilbert W, Jr & Persky, Joseph, 1999. " Robust Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(3-4), pages 299-310, June.
  6. Slutsky, Steven M, 1977. "A Characterization of Societies with Consistent Majority Decision," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 211-25, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2013. "Who’s Favored by Evaluative Voting ? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election," Working Papers of BETA 2013-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  2. Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
  3. Pivato, Marcus, 2011. "Variable-population voting rules," MPRA Paper 31896, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Pivato, Marcus, 2014. "Formal utilitarianism and range voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 50-56.

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