The Clarke Pivotal Voting Mechanism (CPVM) elicits truthful revelation of utility functions by requiring any `pivotal' voter to pay a monetary `Clarke tax'. This neglects wealth effects and gives disproportionate power to rich voters. We propose to replace the `Clarke tax' with a lottery, wherein the pivotal voter risks long-term exclusion from the CPVM (and any other formal political participation). The resulting voting mechanism is nonmanipulable, politically egalitarian, and implements something close to Relative Utilitarianism.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
3964.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Dhillon, A. & Mertens, J.F., 1993.
"Relative Utilitarianism,"
Papers
9348, Universite catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics (CORE).