Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent?
AbstractTheories of justice in the spirit of Rawls and Harsanyi argue that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society as if in the original position, that is, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing their own social positions in society. In this paper, we provide a framework showing that preferences in front of the veil of ignorance (i.e., in face of every day risky situations) are entirely determined by ethical preferences behind the veil. Moreover, by contrast with Kariv & Zame (2008), in many cases of interest, the converse is not true: ethical decisions cannot be deduced from economic ones. This not only rehabilitates distributive theories of justice but even proves that standard decision theory in economic environments cannot be separated from ethical questioning.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School in its series ESSEC Working Papers with number DR 09016.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Business Ethics; Distributional Justice; Maximin Principle; Moral Preferences; Original Position; Social Choice; Social Preferences; Theory of Justice; Utilitarianism; Veil of Ignorance;
Other versions of this item:
- Gaël Giraud & Cécile Renouard, 2010. "Is the veil of ignorance transparent ?," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Gaël Giraud & Cécile Renouard, 2010. "Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent ?," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00469112, HAL.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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- Radu Vranceanu & Claire Naiditch, 2009.
"Remittances as a Social Status Signaling Device,"
- Baroni, Michel & Barthélémy, Fabrice & Mokrane, Mahdi, 2005. "A PCA Factor Repeat Sales Index (1973-2001) To Forecast Apartment Prices in Paris (France)," ESSEC Working Papers DR 05002, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
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