The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations

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The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations

Author Info

Perry, M.
Vincent, D.R.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Motty Perry

Abstract

We illustrate by means of a dynamic research and development race that, while at some points in the race, social incentives and private incentives may coincide, at other points they may diverge-- too many researchers remain that race.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics in its series UWO Department of Economics Working Papers with number 9611.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9611

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Article
- Motty Perry & Daniel R. Vincent, 2002. "The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(4), pages 1035-1052, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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