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Daniel R. Vincent

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This is information that was supplied by Daniel Vincent in registering through RePEc. If you are Daniel R. Vincent , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: Daniel
Middle Name: R.
Last Name: Vincent
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pvi294

Email: [This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Homepage: http://econ-server.umd.edu/~vincent/
Postal Address:
Phone:

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Maryland
Location: College Park, Maryland (United States)
Homepage: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/
Email:
Phone: 301-405-3266
Fax: 301-405-3542
Postal: College Park, MD 20742
Handle: RePEc:edi:deumdus (more details at EDIRC)

Works

as in new window

Working papers

  1. Alejandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent, 2004. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly," Working Papers 2004.153, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Marius Schwartz & Daniel Vincent, 2002. "Same Price, Cash, or Card: Vertical Control by Payment Networks," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Papers of Peter Cramton 98cra2, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton.
  4. Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1997. "Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses," Papers of Peter Cramton 97cra1b, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton.
  5. Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1997. "Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 97cra, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton.
  6. Perry, M. & Vincent, D.R., 1996. "The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9611, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  7. R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1994. "Sequentially Optimal Auctions," Discussion Papers 1104, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Alejandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent, 1992. "Optimal Procurement Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 999, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1992. "Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 977, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Daniel R. Vincent, 1991. "Principals and Partners: The Structure of Syndicates," Discussion Papers 909, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1991. "The Afternoon Effect," Discussion Papers 961, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Morton I. Kamien & Daniel R. Vincent, 1991. "Price Regulation and Quality of Service," Discussion Papers 920, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Daniel R. Vincent, 1990. "Modeling Competitive Behavior," Discussion Papers 893, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Chaim Fershtman & Zvi Safra & Daniel Vincent, 1990. "Delayed Agreements and Non-Expected Utility," Discussion Papers 867, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Daniel R. Vincent, 1989. "Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices are Kept Secret," Discussion Papers 838, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Daniel R. Vincent, 1989. "Bilateral Monopoly, Non-durable Goods and Dynamic Trading Relationships," Discussion Papers 832, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  17. Daniel R. Vincent, 1988. "Dynamic Auctions," Discussion Papers 770, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Daniel R. Vincent, 1988. "Bargaining with Common Values," Discussion Papers 775, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Articles

  1. Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R., 2012. "Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2492-2493.
  2. Jacek Krawczyk & Christopher Sissons & Daniel Vincent, 2012. "Optimal versus satisfactory decision making: a case study of sales with a target," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 233-254, May.
  3. Alejandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent, 2010. "Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(6), pages 1905-1938, November.
  4. Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R., 2007. "Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 153-185, November.
  5. Schwartz Marius & Vincent Daniel R., 2006. "The No Surcharge Rule and Card User Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payment Network," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-31, March.
  6. Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R., 2006. "Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 1-35, March.
  7. Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R., 2004. "Duality in procurement design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 411-428, June.
  8. McAfee, R Preston & Quan, Daniel C & Vincent, Daniel R, 2002. "How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 391-416, December.
  9. Motty Perry & Daniel R. Vincent, 2002. "The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(4), pages 1035-1052, November.
  10. R. Preston McAfee & Wendy Takacs & Daniel R. Vincent, 1999. "Tariffying Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(1), pages 158-179, Spring.
  11. Uzi Segal & Daniel R. Vincent, 1998. "Punishment Schedules for Capital Flight," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(5), pages 629-638, 07.
  12. Vincent, Daniel R, 1998. "Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 275-93, May.
  13. McAfee, R. Preston & Vincent, Daniel, 1997. "Sequentially Optimal Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 246-276, February.
  14. Vincent Daniel R., 1995. "Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 575-584, April.
  15. Manelli, Alejandro M & Vincent, Daniel R, 1995. "Optimal Procurement Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 591-620, May.
  16. McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June.
  17. McAfee, R Preston & Vincent, Daniel, 1992. "Updating the Reserve Price in Common-Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 512-18, May.
  18. Daniel R. Vincent, 1992. "Modelling Competitive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(4), pages 590-599, Winter.
  19. Fershtman, Chaim & Safra, Zvi & Vincent, Daniel, 1991. "Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 423-437, November.
  20. Vincent, Daniel R, 1990. "Dynamic Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 49-61, January.
  21. Vincent, Daniel R., 1989. "Bargaining with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 47-62, June.

NEP Fields

1 paper by this author was announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2005-01-16. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2005-01-16. Author is listed

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
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