Preferences Over Solutions to the Margaining Probem
AbstractThere are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, the authors find it useful to study preferences over solutions in their own right. They identify a set of appealing axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution, which turns out to be the solution of Nash. The key axiom is mixture symmetry, implying that if two solutions are equally attractive, then the half-half mixture of them is (weakly) preferred to any other mixture of the two.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics in its series UWO Department of Economics Working Papers with number 9518.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Reference Centre, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
Phone: 519-661-2111 Ext.85244
Web page: http://economics.uwo.ca/research/research_papers/department_working_papers.html
BARGAINING; ECONOMIC MODELS;
Other versions of this item:
- Kim C. Border & Uzi Segal, 1997. "Preferences over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 1-18, January.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
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- Haskel, Jonathan & Sanchis, Amparo, 2000.
"A bargaining model of Farrell inefficiency,"
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- Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel De Lara & Héctor Ramírez Cabrera, 2011. "Bargaining with intertemporal maximin payoffs," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-7, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
- Naeve-Steinweg, E., 2004. "The averaging mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 410-424, February.
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