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Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory

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Author Info

  • Trockel,W.

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

The present paper provides a method by which the Nash Program may be embedded into mechanism theory. It is shown that any result stating the support of any solution of a cooperative game in coalitional form by a Nash equilibrium of some suitable game in strategic form can be used to derive the mechanism theoretic Nash-implementation of that solution.

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File URL: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-305.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 305.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:305

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Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld
Phone: +49(0)521-106-4907
Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/
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References

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  1. Border, Kim C. & Segal, Uzi, 1995. "Preferences Over Solution to the Bargaining Problem," Working Papers 923, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  3. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1997. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Working Papers 217, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  4. Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
  5. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
  6. Jackson, Matthew O, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated.Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 757-75, October.
  7. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.
  8. Walter Trockel, 2000. "Implementations of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 277-294.
  9. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
  11. Claus-Jochen Haake, 1998. "Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Working Papers 301, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  12. Trockel,W., 1999. "A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution," Working Papers 310, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  13. Damme, Eric van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 78-100, February.
  14. Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February.
  15. Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Working Papers 308, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  16. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
  17. E. Maskin, 1983. "The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey," Working papers 333, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  18. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August.
  19. Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June.
  20. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January.
  21. Damme, E.E.C. van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154426, Tilburg University.
  22. Walter Trockel, 1995. "An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Working Papers 245, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  23. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  24. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  25. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
  26. Border, K.C. & Segal, U., 1995. "Preferences Over Solutions to the Margaining Probem," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9518, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  27. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  28. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "A Walrasian approach to bargaining games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 295-301, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Nash implementation and the bargaining problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 333-351, September.
  2. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Walter Trockel, 2009. "An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution," Working Papers 426, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  4. Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
  5. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2007. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Working Papers 393, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  6. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, FundaciĆ³n SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
  7. Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Working Papers 308, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  8. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Working Papers 322, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  9. Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2009. "Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 177-187, March.
  10. Ju, Yuan, 2012. "Reject and renegotiate: The Shapley value in multilateral bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 431-436.

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