Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory

Contents:

Author Info

  • Walter Trockel

    ()
    (Institute of Mathematical Economics , Bielefeld University, Universitätsstrasse 25, 33615 Bielefeld, Germany)

Abstract

The present paper provides a method by which the Nash Program may be embedded into mechanism theory. It is shown that any result stating the support of any solution of a cooperative game in coalitional form by a Nash equilibrium of some suitable game in strategic form can be used to derive the mechanism theoretic Nash-implementation of that solution.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/papers/2007001/20070027.pdf
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 7 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 27-43

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:27-43

Note: Received: 29 June 1999 / Accepted: 3 April 2002
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; non-cooperative game theory; mechanism theory; Nash program; mechanism; implementation;

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.
  2. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  3. Border, K.C. & Segal, U., 1995. "Preferences Over Solutions to the Margaining Probem," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9518, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  4. Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Working Papers 308, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  5. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February.
  7. Walter Trockel, 2000. "Implementations of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 277-294.
  8. Roberto Serrano, 1996. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Working Papers 161, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  9. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1998. "Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games," Economic theory and game theory 006, Nir Dagan.
  10. Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June.
  11. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Damme, Eric van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 78-100, February.
  14. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
  15. Trockel,W., 1999. "A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution," Working Papers 310, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  16. Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
  17. Border, Kim C. & Segal, Uzi, 1995. "Preferences Over Solution to the Bargaining Problem," Working Papers 923, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  18. Walter Trockel, 1995. "An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Working Papers 245, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  19. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Voluntary Implementation," Working Papers 1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  20. E. Maskin, 1983. "The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey," Working papers 333, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  21. Damme, E.E.C. van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154426, Tilburg University.
  22. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  23. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  24. Claus-Jochen Haake, 1998. "Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Working Papers 301, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  25. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
  26. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January.
  27. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "A Walrasian approach to bargaining games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 295-301, June.
  28. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Walter Trockel, 2009. "An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution," Working Papers 426, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  2. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2007. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Working Papers 393, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  4. Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
  5. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Working Papers 322, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  6. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  7. Ju, Yuan, 2012. "Reject and renegotiate: The Shapley value in multilateral bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 431-436.
  8. Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Working Papers 308, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  9. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Nash implementation and the bargaining problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 333-351, September.
  10. Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2009. "Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 177-187, March.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:27-43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.