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On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution

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Walter Trockel (UCLA)

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 788.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:788

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Economics Series 25, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
  3. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Jackson, Matthew O, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated.Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 757-75, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Walter Trockel, 2002. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  9. Damme, Eric van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 78-100, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. R. H. Parker, Y. Lemarchand, T. Boyns, 1997. "Introduction," Accounting, Business and Financial History, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 7(3), pages 251-257, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1997. "Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games," Economics Working Papers 217, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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  13. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  19. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "A Walrasian approach to bargaining games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 295-301, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Working Papers 308, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
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