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On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution

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  • Walter Trockel

    (UCLA)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 788.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:788

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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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  1. Damme, Eric van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 78-100, February.
  2. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August.
  3. Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1998. "Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games," Economic theory and game theory 006, Nir Dagan.
  5. Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June.
  6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  7. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.
  8. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
  11. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Economics Series 25, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  12. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  13. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  14. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Claus-Jochen Haake, 1998. "Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Working Papers 301, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  16. Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February.
  17. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "A Walrasian approach to bargaining games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 295-301, June.
  18. Damme, E.E.C. van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154426, Tilburg University.
  19. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Working Papers 308, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.

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