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Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game

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  • Sun,N.
  • Trockel,W.

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Yang,Z.

Abstract

We extend the analysis of competitive outcomes in TU market games of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1975. Competitive outcomes in the cores of market games. International Journal of Game Theory 4, 229-237] in two ways. First, our representing economies are coalition production economies. Second, and more importantly, our analysis holds for arbitrary TU games. By adopting the C-stable set of Guesnerie and Oddou [Guesnerie, R., Oddou, C., 1979. On economic games which are not necessarily superadditive. Economics Letters 3, 301-306], renamed c-core in our paper, we are able to characterize competitive outcomes even in games with empty core. As competitive outcomes are associated with specific coalition structures, our main result provides an endogenous determination of coalition building and shows that the c-core of any TU game coincides with the set of competitive outcomes of the corresponding coalition production economy.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 358.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:358

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  1. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Stéphane Gonzalez & Michel Grabisch, 2013. "Multicoalitional solutions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00881108, HAL.
  2. Tomoki Inoue, 2010. "Representation of TU games by coalition production economies," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 430, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  3. Ju, Yuan, 2012. "Reject and renegotiate: The Shapley value in multilateral bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 431-436.
  4. Myrna Wooders, 2009. "Market Games and Clubs," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics 0919, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  5. Stéphane Gonzalez & Michel Grabisch, 2014. "Autonomous coalitions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01021328, HAL.
  6. Bejan, Camelia & Gómez, Juan Camilo, 2012. "A market interpretation of the proportional extended core," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 636-638.
  7. Camelia Bejan & Juan Gómez, 2012. "Axiomatizing core extensions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 885-898, November.
  8. Inoue, Tomoki, 2012. "Representation of transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 143-147.
  9. Inoue, Tomoki, 2013. "Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 141-149.
  10. Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2011. "Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 453, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  11. Stéphane Gonzalez & Michel Grabisch, 2014. "Autonomous coalitions," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14044, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  12. Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2011. "Competitive Outcomes and the Core of TU Market Games," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 454, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.

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