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Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets

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Author Info
Claus-Jochen Haake () (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
Abstract

We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equilibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed.

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File URL: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-366.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Second version, 2007
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 366.

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Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:366

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Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/
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Related research
Keywords: support result; object division; market; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions," Discussion Papers 0102-16, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jim Bergin & John Duggan, 1997. "An Implementation-theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Working Papers 964, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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