RePEc Click here to visit UConn Economics IDEAS

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes


Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C79: Other
Most recent items first, undated at the end.
  • 2008 Uncomputability and Undecidability in Economic Theory
    by K. Vela Velupillai [Downloadable!]
  • 2008 Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests
    by Wolfgang Leininger [Downloadable!]
  • 2008 Social Interaction in Tax Evasion
    by Lipatov, Vilen [Downloadable!]
  • 2008 Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem
    by Lahiri, Somdeb [Downloadable!]
  • 2008 An introduction to Economics of Information Biasing (EIB)
    by Zaman, Md Monowaruz [Downloadable!]
  • 2008 A Sensitive Flexible-network Approach
    by Noemí Navarro [Downloadable!]
  • 2008 Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2008 The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests
    by Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Lorenz rankings of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims
    by William Thomson [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency
    by Toru Hokari & William Thomson [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims
    by William Thomson [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Attitude polarization
    by Alexander Zimper & Alexander Ludwig [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 On the Co-evolution of Insider Information and Idiosyncratic Beliefs
    by Thomas Gehrig & Werner Gueth & Rene Levinsky [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Positional Power in Hierarchies
    by René van den Brink & Frank Steffen [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Belief Free Incomplete Information Games
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Pricing without Priors
    by Dirk Bergemann & Karl H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Strategic Distinguishability with an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Social Memory and Evidence from the Past
    by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 An Ascending Auction for Independent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Intentions, Trust and Frames: A note on Sociality and the Theory of Games
    by Vittorio Pelligra [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Lower bounds and recursive methods for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims
    by Diego Dominguez [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Exchange Rate Determination: A Model of the Decisive Role of Central Bank Cooperation and Conflict
    by Robin Pope & Reinhard Selten & Sebastian Kube & Johannes Kaiser & Jürgen von Hagen [Downloadable!]
  • 2007 Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information
    by Jihong Lee [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Rationality of expectations: comparison of neoclassical and evolutionary approaches
    by Emilia Tomczyk [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries
    by Florian Englmaier & Markus Reisinger [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims
    by William Thomson & Chun-Hsien Yeh [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 A Characterization of a Family of Rules for the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims
    by William Thomson [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 The Two-Agent Claims-Truncated Proportional Rule Has No Consistent Extension: A Constructive Proof
    by William Thomson [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 On the Existence of Consistent Rules to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims: A Constructive Geometric Approach
    by William Thomson [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Active Courts and Menu Contracts
    by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 A Deliberative Independent Central Bank
    by Erwin Jericha & Martin Schürz [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle
    by GORDON, Sidartha [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Modes of Spousal Interaction and the Labor Market Environment
    by Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 ELEVEN - Tests needed for a Recommendation
    by Karl Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Building Social Networks
    by Robert P. Gilles & Sudipta Sarangi [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Active Courts and Menu Contracts
    by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write?
    by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries
    by Florian Englmaier & Markus Reisinger [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Active Courts and Menu Contracts
    by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Modes of Spousal Interaction and the Labor Market Environment
    by Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn [Downloadable!]
  • 2006 Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations
    by Spiegler, Ran [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Individual Preferences for Giving
    by Raymond Fisman & Shachar Kariv & Daniel Markovits [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Trust among Strangers
    by Teck-Hua Ho & Keith Weigelt [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?
    by Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?
    by Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: The Stability Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement
    by Rob Dellink & Michael Finus & Niels Olieman [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Tolerable Intolerance: An Evolutionary Model
    by Martin Gregor [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret
    by Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Stable networks and convex payoffs
    by Gilles, Robert P. & Sarangi, Sudipta [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Explicit and latent authority in hierarchical organizations
    by Brink, Rene van den & Gilles, Robert P. [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 A concede-and-divide rule for bankruptcy problems
    by Quant, M. & Borm, Peter & Maaten, Rogier [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Information in Mechanism Design
    by Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Information in Mechanism Design
    by Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Robust Monopoly Pricing
    by Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Flexibility as an Instrument in Digital Rights Management
    by Dirk Bergemann & Thomas Eisenbach & Joan Feigenbaum & Scott Shenker [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Ex Post Implementation
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Network Potentials
    by Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert P. Gilles [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism
    by Raymond Fisman & Shachar Kariv & Daniel Markovits [Downloadable!]
  • 2005 Teoría de la utilidad neoclásica: un juego semántico de interacción estratégica
    by Boris Salazar & Andrés Cendales [Downloadable!]
  • 2004 Robust Mechanism Design
    by Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann [Downloadable!]
  • 2004 Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting
    by Han, Seungjin [Downloadable!]
  • 2004 A New Solution to the Problem of Adjudicating Conflicting Claims
    by Diego Dominguez & William Thomson [Downloadable!]
  • 2004 Positive Harmony Transformations and Equilibrium Selection in Two-Player Games
    by Daniel John Zizzo [Downloadable!]
  • 2004 Interbanking networks : towards a small financial world ?
    by Sébastien Vivier-Lirimont [Downloadable!]
  • 2004 La théorie des modèles non coopératifs d'offre de travail et ses applications empiriques
    by Olivier Donni [Downloadable!]
  • 2004 Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game
    by Christophe Deissenberg & Herbert Dawid & Pavel Sevcik [Downloadable!]
  • 2004 Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations
    by Rene van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles [Downloadable!]
  • 2004 Fending off one Means Fending off all: Evolutionary Stability in Submodular Games
    by Wolfgang Leininger [Downloadable!]
  • 2004 Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare
    by Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]
  • 2004 Nash y von Neumann: mundos posibles y juegos de lenguaje
    by Boris Salazar [Downloadable!]
  • 2004 The class of opportunity filters and the preference revealed by a path independent choice function
    by Somdeb Lahiri [Downloadable!]
  • 2003 Multigame models of innovation in evolutionary economics
    by M. J. Gagen [Downloadable!]
  • 2003 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?
    by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite [Downloadable!]
  • 2003 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?
    by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite [Downloadable!]
  • 2003 Discrimination and workers' expectations
    by Antonio Filippin [Downloadable!]
  • 2003 Discrimination and Workers' Expectations
    by Filippin, Antonio [Downloadable!]
  • 2003 Discrimination and Workers' Expectations
    by Filippin, Antonio [Downloadable!]
  • 2003 Technology, Organisation and Productivity Performance in Services: Lessons from Britain and the United States, 1870-1990
    by Broadberry, Stephen & Sayantan Ghosal [Downloadable!]
  • 2003 Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations
    by René van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles [Downloadable!]
  • 2003 Robust Mechanism Design
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2003 Robust Mechanism Design
    by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris [Downloadable!]
  • 2003 Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect
    by Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Jörg Oechssler [Downloadable!]
  • 2002 Social Reciprocity
    by Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews [Downloadable!]
  • 2002 Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players
    by Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal [Downloadable!]
  • 2002 The Shapley value for partition function form games
    by Pham Do, K.H. & Norde, H. [Downloadable!]
  • 2002 Contests over Public Goods: Evolutionary Stability and the Free-Rider Problem
    by Wolfgang Leininger [Downloadable!]
  • 2002 Absolute Expediency and Imitative Behaviour
    by Antonio J. Morales Siles [Downloadable!]
  • 2002 symposium articles : A note on the wise girls puzzle
    by Mariko Yasugi & Sobei H. Oda [Downloadable!]
  • 2001 Quantum Market Games
    by E. W. Piotrowski & J. Sladkowski [Downloadable!]
  • 2001 Evolution and Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs
    by Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm [Downloadable!]
  • 2001 Pareto-Improving Cheating In An Economic Policy Game
    by Christophe Deissenberg and Francisco Alvarez Gonzalez
  • 2001 A note on Rubinstein's ``Why are certain properties of binary relations relatively more common in natural language?"
    by Beard, Rodney [Downloadable!]
  • 2001 A note on Rubinstein's ``Why are certain properties of binary relations relatively more common in natural language?"
    by Beard, Rodney [Downloadable!]
  • 2001 Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies
    by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite [Downloadable!]
  • 2001 Is Trust Self-Fulfilling? An Experimental Study
    by Michael Bacharach & Gerardo A. Guerra & Daniel John Zizzo [Downloadable!]
  • 2001 Testing Threats in Repeated Games
    by Spiegler, R.
  • 2001 Finite coverings by cones
    by Tijs, S. & Reijnierse, H. [Downloadable!]
  • 2001 Evolutionary Rent-Seeking
    by Hehenkamp, Burkhard & Leininger, Wolfgang & Possajennikov, Alex [Downloadable!]
  • 2001 On the existence and efficiency of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a n-player prisoners' dilemma
    by Noritsugu Nakanishi [Downloadable!]
  • 2001 A value for mixed action-set games
    by Emilio Calvo & J. Carlos Santos [Downloadable!]
  • 2001 Liability Rules and Evolutionary Dynamics
    by Mingli Zheng
  • 2000 The Game Academics Play: Editors Versus Authors
    by Joao Ricardo Faria [Downloadable!]
  • 2000 On Kolmogorov Complexity and the Costs of Carrying out Strategies
    by Justin Smith
  • 2000 Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players
    by Khan, A. & Sun, Y.
  • 2000 Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games
    by Josef Hofbauer & Karl H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 2000 research articles : The stand-alone test and decreasing serial cost sharing
    by Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Thorlund-Petersen [Downloadable!]
  • 1999 Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models
    by Sjaak Hurkens & Karl H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 1999 Endogenous local interaction and multi-product firms
    by Bauke Visser [Downloadable!]
  • 1998 Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria:Theoretical Foundations and Applications
    by V. Bhaskar & Fernando Vega-Redondo [Downloadable!]
  • 1998 Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
    by Mailath, G.J. & Morris, S.
  • 1998 Updating Strategies Through Observed Play - Optimization Under Bounded Rationality
    by R. Cressman & K.H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 1997 Equilibrium Departures From Common Knowledge in Games With Non-Additive Expected Utility
    by Mukerji, S. & Song Shin, H.
  • 1997 On the Connection Between Correlated Equilibria and Sunspot Equilibria
    by Davila, J.
  • 1997 Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game
    by Ponti, G.B,
  • 1997 Break-offs in Bargaining, Evidence from a Video Experiment
    by Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
  • 1996 Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game
    by Giovanni Ponti [Downloadable!]
  • 1996 The Stationary Distribution of Autonomous Ito Process
    by Bakker, A.
  • 1996 Individual and Collective Time-Consistency
    by Asheim, G.B.
  • 1996 Admission and Common Knowledge
    by Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M.
  • 1996 Migration and the Evolution of Conventions
    by Bhaskar, V & Vega-Redondo, F
  • 1996 Rationality of Bargaining Solutions
    by Sanchez, M.C.
  • 1996 Technological Progress, Mobility and Economic Growth
    by Galor, O. & Tsiddon, D.
  • 1996 Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy
    by Dexit, A. & Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E.
  • 1996 The Road to Full Employment: Co-ordination in a World of Interdepent Decisions
    by Gill, F.
  • 1996 Vulcans and Klingons (part one): Simulating an Evolutionary Game with Random Matching and Adjustable Expectations
    by Gaspart, F.
  • 1996 Procedures for Computing Equilibria of the Oligopoly Expansion Game Under Predetermined Multi-Period Pricings, Part II: Second-Lowest Marginal-Cost Pricing
    by Wei, J.Y. & Smeers, Y.
  • 1996 Procedures for Computing Equilibria of the Oligopoly Expansion Game Under Predetermined Multi-Period Pricings, Part I: Short-Run Optimal Spot Pricing
    by Wei, J.Y. & Smeers, Y.
  • 1996 Spatially Oligopolistic Models With Cournot Producers and Regulation Transportation Prices
    by Wei, J.Y. & Smeers, Y.
  • 1996 A Remark on the Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form
    by Ray, I.
  • 1996 Decentralization and Collusion
    by Baliga, S. & Sjostrom, T.
  • 1996 Interacive Implementation
    by Baliga, S. & Sjostrom, T.
  • 1996 On Bargaining for an Indivisible Good
    by Garratt, R.
  • 1996 Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability
    by Gale, D. & Rosental, R.W.
  • 1996 The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules : A Global Stability Result
    by Anderlini, L & Sabourian, H
  • 1996 Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
    by Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J. [Downloadable!]
  • 1996 Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Transfers
    by Baliga, S. & Evans, R.
  • 1996 One against All in the Fictitious Play Process
    by Sela, Aner
  • 1996 On the Evolution of Imitative Behavior
    by Björnerstedt, Jonas, and Karl H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 1996 Equity, Fairness and Prominence, Determinants for the Behavior of Player Groups in a Bargaining Video Experiment
    by Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
  • 1996 Behavior of Groups as Players in a Bargaining Experiment. Some Results on Negotiation Processes from a Video Experiment
    by Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
  • 1996 Evolutionar Dnamics of Populations wirth a Local Interaction Structure
    by Illan Eshel, Emilia Sansone, Avner Shaked [Downloadable!]
  • 1996 On the Interpretation of Evolutionary Stable Sets
    by Balkenborg, Dieter, and Karl H. Schlag
  • 1996 Which one should I imitate?
    by Schlag, Karl H. [Downloadable!]
  • 1996 Spatial Dispersion in Cournot Competition
    by Chamorro, J.M.
  • 1995 Communication, Computability and Common Interest Games
    by Luca Anderlini [Downloadable!]
  • 1995 The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules: A Global Stability Result
    by Luca Anderlini & Hamid Sabourian [Downloadable!]
  • 1995 Preferences Over Solutions to the Margaining Probem
    by Border, K.C. & Segal, U.
  • 1995 Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
    by Forges,F. & Minelli,E.
  • 1995 Public Equilibria of Repeated Games with Signal-Dependent Payoffs
    by Tomala, T.
  • 1995 The Bounds of Bounded Rationality: The Case of Memory Loss
    by Hvide, H.K.
  • 1995 Strike Ballots in a Model with Private Information
    by Goerke, L. & Holler, M.J.
  • 1995 Monitoring,Liquidation,and Security Design
    by Repullo,R. & Suarez,J.
  • 1995 Incentive Compatibility in Large Games
    by Nehring, K.
  • 1995 Incentive Compatibility in Large Games
    by Nehring, K.
  • 1995 Exploitation and Efficiency in Agrarian Contracts
    by Chambers, R.G. & Quiggin, J.
  • 1995 Coalition Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers
    by Evans,R.
  • 1995 Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits
    by Karl H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 1995 The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction
    by R. Cressman, K.H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 1995 Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model
    by Illan Eshel, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked [Downloadable!]
  • 1995 Dynamic Stability in Perturbed Games
    by R. Cressman & K. H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 1995 Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Population Games
    by Balkenborg, Dieter, and Karl H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 1995 Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case
    by Maschler, M.
  • 1995 the Failling Rate of Profit. Entry, Exit, and Coordination with Mixed Strategies
    by Vettas, N.
  • 1994 When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?
    by Karl H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 1994 Evolution in Partnership Games,an Equivalence Result
    by Karl H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • 1994 Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution
    by Schlag, Karl H. [Downloadable!]
  • 1994 Arbitrage in Markets with Unbounded Short Sales: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Nonemptiness of the Core and Existence of Equilibrium
    by Page, F.H.Jr. & Wooders, M.H.
  • 1992 Theorizing Industrial Relations: The Dominance of Logical Positivism and the Shift to Strategic Choice
    by Larouche, V. & Audet, M.
  • 1991 Industrial Relations a Shift Towards "Strategic Choice"?
    by Larouche, V. & Audet, M.
  • 1985 Difference Identities for Unemployment Rates
    by George Cave [Downloadable!]
  • Heterogeneity, Local Information, and Global Interaction
    by Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher [Downloadable!]
  • Evolutionary Choice of Markets
    by Anke Gerber & Marc Oliver Bettzüge [Downloadable!]
  • The Tenure Game: Building Up Academic Habits
    by João Ricardo Faria & Gonçalo Monteiro [Downloadable!]
  • On the Efficiency-Effects of Private (Dis-)Trust in the Government
    by Herbert Dawid & Christophe Deissenberg [Downloadable!]
  • Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?
    by Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, & Andrew Postlewaite [Downloadable!]
  • Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies
    by Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite [Downloadable!]
  • On the Evolution of Imitative Behavior
    by Jonas Bjoernerstedt & Karl H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi- Armed Bandits
    by Karl H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction
    by R. Cressman & K.H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • Sophisticated Imitation in Cyclic Games
    by Hofbauer, Josef, and Karl H. Schlag [Downloadable!]
  • A non-standard approach to a market with boundedly rational consumers and strategic firms. Part I: A microfoundation for the evolution of sales
    by Christina Matzke, Benedikt Wirth [Downloadable!]
  • International Environmental Agreements -The Role of Foresight
    by Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis [Downloadable!]
  • Equilibrium Binding Agreements under Diverse Bahavioral Assumptions
    by Effrosyni Diamantoudi [Downloadable!]

    This page was last updated on 2008-7-20.


    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.