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Assessing risky social situations

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  • Marc Fleurbaey

Abstract

This paper re-examines the welfare economics of risk. It singles out a class of criteria, the “expected equally-distributed equivalent”, as the unique class which avoids serious drawbacks of existing approaches. Such criteria behave like ex-post criteria when the final statistical distribution of wellbeing is known ex ante, and like ex-ante criteria when risk generates no inequality. The paper also provides a new result on the tension between inequality aversion and respect of individual ex ante preferences, in the vein of Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem.

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File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27006/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library in its series LSE Research Online Documents on Economics with number 27006.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:27006

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