Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance

Contents:

Author Info

  • B. Dahlby
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00133751
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 37 (1981)
    Issue (Month): 3 (January)
    Pages: 547-558

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:37:y:1981:i:3:p:547-558

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Johnson, William R, 1978. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: Comment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 693-96, November.
    2. Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
    3. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Hansen, Bodil O. & Keiding, Hans, 2002. "Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 739-756, September.
    2. Pau Olivella & Marcos Vera-Hernandez, 2006. "Testing for adverse selection into private medical insurance," IFS Working Papers W06/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    3. Roland Eisen, 1986. "Wettbewerb und Regulierung in der Versicherung. Die Rolle asymmetrischer Information," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 122(III), pages 339-358, September.
    4. Heinrich, Ralph P. & Koop, Michael J. & Boss, Alfred & Gröhn, Andreas & Kopp, Andreas & Rosenschon, Astrid & Schmidt, Rainer, 1996. "Sozialpolitik im Transformationsprozeß Mittel- und Osteuropas," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 860, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    5. Neudeck, Werner & Podczeck, Konrad, 1996. "Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 387-408, August.
    6. FLEURBAEY, Marc, . "Assessing risky social situations," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2289, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Robin Boadway & Manuel Leite-Monteiro & Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau, 2006. "Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 279-298, 07.
    8. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2013. "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Documentos de Trabajo 302, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    9. Sophia Delipalla & Owen O'Donnell, 1999. "The Political Economy of a Publicly Provided Private Good with Adverse Selection," Studies in Economics 9911, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
    10. Yukihiro Nishimura, 2009. "Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 176-197, April.
    11. Belli, Paolo, 2001. "How adverse selection affects the health insurance market," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2574, The World Bank.
    12. Kifmann, Mathias, 2002. "Community rating in health insurance and different benefit packages," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 719-737, September.
    13. Danzon, Patricia M., 2002. "Welfare effects of supplementary insurance: a comment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 923-926, September.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:37:y:1981:i:3:p:547-558. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.