Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 37 (1981)
Issue (Month): 3 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Sophia Delipalla & Owen O'Donnell, 1999. "The Political Economy of a Publicly Provided Private Good with Adverse Selection," Studies in Economics 9911, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
- Yukihiro Nishimura, 2009. "Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 176-197, April.
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