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Social Aggregation Without the Expected Utility Hypothesis

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Author Info

  • Charles Blackorby

    (University of Warwick)

  • David Donaldson

    (University of British Columbia - University of British Columbia)

  • Philippe Mongin

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

Abstract

L'article examine les conditions qui permettent de satisfaire simultanément les versions ex ante et ex post du principe de Pareto, lorsqu'on cesse d'imposer l'hypothèse de l'utilité espérée aux préférences individuelles et sociales. Avec des probabilités subjectives qui peuvent varier, on obtient trois théorèmes d'impossibilité sans avoir à faire cette hypothèse. Lorsque les probabilités sont "objectives" (identiques pour tous), on obtient un théorème de caractérisation pour les préférences (Théorème 4). Celles des individus sont compatibles non seulement avec l'utilité espérée subjective, mais aussi avec certaines variantes non linéaires, notamment "l'utilité anticipée". Les préférences sociales sont en général du type séparable et pondéré. Ce résultat est à comparer au théorème d'agrégation de Harsanyi, qui part de l'hypothèse d'utilité espérée "objective" pour les individus et l'observateur.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00242932.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242932

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00242932/en/
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Related research

Keywords: Utilité espérée; Utilité anticipée; Séparabilité; Principe de Pareto; Economie du bien-être ex ante et ex post;

References

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  1. Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David & Weymark, John A., 1999. "Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem for state-contingent alternatives1," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 365-387, November.
  2. Itzhak Gilboa & Dov Samet & David Schmeidler, 2001. "Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes," Game Theory and Information 0105001, EconWPA.
  3. Mongin, P., . "Consistent Bayesian aggregation," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1176, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. P. Mongin & C. d'Aspremont, 1996. "Utility theory and ethics," THEMA Working Papers 96-32, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  5. Epstein, Larry G & Segal, Uzi, 1992. "Quadratic Social Welfare Functions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 691-712, August.
  6. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
  7. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1997. "On the Measurement of Inequality under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 194-204, July.
  8. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309.
  9. Hammond, P.J. & , ., 1987. "Consequentialist foundations for expected utility," CORE Discussion Papers 1987016, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Hammond, Peter J, 1981. "Ex-ante and Ex-post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 48(191), pages 235-50, August.
  11. Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, 2002. "Individual Sense of Justice: A Utility Representation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(1), pages 263-284, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Marc Fleurbaey, 2009. "Assessing risky social situations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27006, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  2. Chambers, Christopher P. & Hayashi, Takashi, 2006. "Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 430-440, February.
  3. Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Marc Tallon & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud, 2005. "On the impossibility of preference aggregation under uncertainty," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v05012, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  4. Blanchard, Michel & Blanchard, Frederic, 2007. "Optimism, Pessimism, and the Gains from Trade," MPRA Paper 6342, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Mongin, Philippe & Pivato, Marcus, 2012. "Ranking Multidimensional Alternatives and Uncertain Prospects," MPRA Paper 42515, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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