Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes
AbstractSeveral authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utilitarian aggregation: both society`s utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 2001-17.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.asp
More information through EDIRC
EFFICIENCY ; UTILITY FUNCTIONS ; PROBABILITY;
Other versions of this item:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- P. Mongin., 1997.
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THEMA Working Papers
97-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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- MONGIN, Philippe, 1996. "The Paradox of the Bayesian Experts and State-Dependent Utility Theory," CORE Discussion Papers 1996026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- DE MEYER, Bernard & MONGIN , Philippe, 1994. "A Note on Affine Aggregation," CORE Discussion Papers 1994014, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1979. "The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1321-36, November.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309.
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