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Quadratic Social Welfare Functions

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Author Info
Epstein, Larry G
Segal, Uzi

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Abstract

John Harsanyi has provided an intriguing argument that social welfare can be expressed as a weighted sum of individual utilities. His theorem has been criticized on the grounds that a central axiom, that social preference satisfies the independence axiom, has the morally unacceptable implication that the process of choice and considerations of ex ante fairness are of no importance. This paper presents a variation of Harsanyi's theorem in which the axioms are compatible with a concern for ex ante fairness. The implied mathematical form for social welfare is a strictly quasi-concave and quadratic function of individual utilities. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 100 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 691-712
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:100:y:1992:i:4:p:691-712

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  1. Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson & Philippe Mongin, 2004. "Social Aggregation Without the Expected Utility Hypothesis," Working Papers hal-00242932_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kjell Brekke & Hilde Lurå & Karine Nyborg, 1996. "Allowing disagreement in evaluations of social welfare," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 303-324, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Thibault Gajdos & Feriel Kandil, 2008. "The ignorant observer," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 193-232, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Andranik Tangian & Josef Gruber, . "Constructing Quadratic, Polynomial, and Separable Objective Functions," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _056, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Kim C. Border & Paolo Ghirardato & Uzi Segal, 2005. "Objective Subjective Probabilities," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 616, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 07 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Michele Bernasconi, 2002. "How should income be divided? questionnaire evidence from the theory of “Impartial preferences”," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 163-195, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Traub, Stefan & Seidl, Christian & Schmidt, Ulrich, 2003. "Lorenz, Pareto, Pigou: Who Scores Best? Experimental Evidence on Dominance Relations of Income Distributions," Economics Working Papers 2003,04, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Marc Fleurbaey, 2007. "Welfare Comparisons of Income Distributions," IDEP Working Papers 0703, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised Jan 2007. [Downloadable!]
  9. Tim Krieger & Stefan Traub, 2008. "Back to Bismarck? Shifting Preferences for Intragenerational Redistribution in OECD Pension Systems," Working Papers 13, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Antoine Bommier & Stéphane Zuber, 2008. "Can preferences for catastrophe avoidance reconcile social discounting with intergenerational equity?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 415-434, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Alon Harel & Zvi Safra & Uzi Segal, 2003. "Ex-Post Egalitarianism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 563, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Seidl, Christian & Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Morone, Andrea, 2003. "Income Distributions versus Lotteries Happiness, Response-Mode Effects, and Preference," Economics Working Papers 2003,01, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. dÕASPREMONT, Claude & GEVERS, Louis, 2001. "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," CORE Discussion Papers 2001040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Traub, Stefan & Seidl, Christian & Schmidt, Ulrich & Levati, Maria Vittoria, 2003. "Friedman, Harsanyi, Rawls, Boulding - or Somebody Else?," Economics Working Papers 2003,03, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Stefan Traub & Christian Seidl & Ulrich Schmidt & M. Vittoria Levati, . "Friedman, Harsanyi, Rawls, Boulding - Or Somebody Else? An Experimental Investigation of Distributive Justice," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-19, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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