Assessing Risky Social Situations
AbstractThis paper reexamines the welfare economics of risk. It singles out a class of criteria, the "expected equally distributed equivalent," as the unique class that avoids serious drawbacks of existing approaches. Such criteria behave like ex post criteria when the final statistical distribution of well-being is known ex ante and like ex ante criteria when risk generates no inequality. The paper also provides a new result on the tension between inequality aversion and respect of individual ex ante preferences, in the vein of Harsanyi's aggregation theorem. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 118 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/
Other versions of this item:
- FLEURBAEY, Marc, . "Assessing risky social situations," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2289, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Marc Fleurbaey, 2009. "Assessing risky social situations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27006, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Marc Fleurbaey, 2007. "Assessing Risky Social Situations," IDEP Working Papers 0703, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised Jan 2007.
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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