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On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences

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Author Info
Rubinstein, Ariel
Safra, Zvi
Thomson, William

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Abstract

This paper questions the interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution. A new definition is suggested. Revisions of Nash axioms characterize the solution. The definition makes possible its extension to non-expected-utility preferences. It also reveals the logic behind the comparative statics of risk aversion and the connection between the Nash bargaining solution and strategic models. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 60 (1992)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 1171-86
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:60:y:1992:i:5:p:1171-86

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  1. Douven, R.C. & Engwerda, J.C., 1995. "Properties of N=Person Axiomatic Bargaining Solutions if the Pareto Frontier is Twice Differentiable and Strictly Concave," Discussion Paper 50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jonathan Shalev, 2002. "Loss Aversion and Bargaining," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 201-232, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Marco Mariotii, 1996. "Fair bargains: distributive justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Game Theory and Information 9611003, EconWPA, revised 27 Nov 1996. [Downloadable!]
  4. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The Time-Preference Nash Solution," Discussion Paper Series dp265, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2005. "Learning From a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," THEMA Working Papers 2006-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions," Discussion Papers 0102-16, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Özgür Kıbrıs & Murat Sertel, 2007. "Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 421-437, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jean-Max Koskievic, 1999. "Négociations et espérance d'utilité dépendante du rang," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 54, pages 10, Avril-Jui. [Downloadable!]
  9. Oscar Volij, 2002. "A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility," Economic theory and game theory 016, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
  10. repec:bep:thetop:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1355-1355 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Harold Houba & Xander Tieman & Rene Brinksma, 1996. "The Nash- and Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution for Decision Weight Utility Functions," Game Theory and Information 9611001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  12. Peters,Hans & Köbberling,Vera, 2000. "The Effect of Decision Weights in Bargaining Problems," Research Memoranda 037, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  13. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
  14. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Oscar Volij, 1999. "On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes," Economic theory and game theory 010, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
  16. Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, 2003. "Moral Sentiments and Social Choice: Fairness Considerations in University Admissions," Economics Working Paper Archive 492, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Committee, Nobel Prize, 1994. "The Work of John Nash in Game Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-2, Nobel Prize Committee. [Downloadable!]
  18. Eran Hanany, 2001. "Ordinal Nash Social Welfare Function," Discussion Papers 1325, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  19. Chambers, Christopher P. & Echenique, Federico, . "When does aggregation reduce uncertainty aversion?," Working Papers 1299, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  20. repec:bep:thecon:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1251-1251 is not listed on IDEAS
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