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Dis&approval voting: a characterization

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  • José Alcantud
  • Annick Laruelle

Abstract

The voting rule considered in this paper belongs to a large class of voting systems, called “range voting” or “utilitarian voting”, where each voter rates each candidate with the help of a given evaluation scale and the winner is the candidate with the highest total score. In approval voting the evaluation scale only consists of two levels: 1 (approval) and 0 (non approval). However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of sufficient knowledge for evaluating the candidate. In this paper we propose a characterization of a rule (that we refer to as dis&approval voting) that allows for a third level in the evaluation scale. The three levels have the following interpretation: 1 means approval, 0 means indifference, abstention or ‘do not know’, and $$-1$$ - 1 means disapproval. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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  • José Alcantud & Annick Laruelle, 2014. "Dis&approval voting: a characterization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 1-10, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:43:y:2014:i:1:p:1-10
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0766-7
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