To approve or not to approve: this is not the only question
AbstractThis paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can express neither a negative opinion nor an opinion on more than one candidate. Approval voting partially fills this gap by asking an opinion on all candidates. Still the choice is only between approval and non approval. However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of sufficient knowledge for approving the candidate. In this paper we characterize the dis&approval voting rule, a natural extension of approval voting that distinguishes between indifference and disapproval.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 41885.
Date of creation: 11 Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Voting rule; approval voting; vote profile;
Other versions of this item:
- Laruelle, Annick & Rodríguez Alcantud, José Carlos, . "To appove or not to approve: this is not the only question," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2012-63, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-10-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2012-10-20 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hillinger, Claude, 2004. "Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments," Discussion Papers in Economics 353, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Hillinger, Claude, 2005.
"The Case for Utilitarian Voting,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
653, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Francisco Arcelus & Gary Mauser & Z. Spindler, 1978. "The right to vote no: revising the voting system and resuscitating the F-Y voter," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 67-83, December.
- Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
- Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 2003.
"Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting,"
03-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2006. "A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 621-625, December.
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