Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records
AbstractThe difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by comparing their votes in a suitable fashion, even without knowing the right answers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3323.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Eyal Baharad & Jacob Goldberger & Moshe Koppel & Shmuel Nitzan, 2012. "Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 113-130, January.
- Eyal Baharad & Jacob Goldberger & Moshe Koppel & Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records," Working Papers 2010-20, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University.
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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