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Optimal Voting Rules

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Author Info
Young, Peyton

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Abstract

Modern social choice theory, following Kenneth Arrow, treats voting as a method for aggregating diverse preferences and values. An earlier view, initiated by Marquis de Condorcet, is that voting is a method for aggregating information. Voters' opinions differ because they make errors of judgment; absent these errors they would all agree on the best choice. The goal is to design a voting rule that identifies the best choice with highest probability. This paper examines maximum likelihood estimation. Surprisingly, the optimal rule can also be axiomatized by variations of Arrow's axioms. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 9 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (Winter)
Pages: 51-64
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:51-64

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  1. Pablo Amorós, 2006. "Eliciting Socially Optimal Rankings from Unfair Jurors," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/10, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2006. "Garbled Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 5958, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Patrick W. Schmitz & Thomas Tröger, 2006. "Garbled Elections," Discussion Papers 195, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Michel Truchon, 2004. "Aggregation of Rankings in Figure Skating," Cahiers de recherche 0414, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stephen Gordon & Michel Truchon, 2008. "Social choice, optimal inference and figure skating," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 265-284, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Hans Gersbach & Lars Siemers, 2005. "Can Democracy Educate a Society?," IZA Discussion Papers 1693, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  6. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1998. "Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 149-175, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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