First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees
AbstractA group of people with identical preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) takes a vote to decide between two alternatives. The first best voting rule is a weighted voting rule that takes into account the different individual competences, and is therefore not anonymous. Under such a rule, it is rational for group members to vote informatively, i.e., according to their private information. The use of any (non-trivial) anonymous voting rule may provide an incentive for some group members to vote strategically, non-informatively. However, this paper shows that the identity of the best anonymous voting rule does not depend on whether or not they actually choose to do so; a single, second best, rule maximizes utility in both cases.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2003-08.
Date of creation: Oct 2003
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strategic voting; informative voting; committees; imperfect information;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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