Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gerling, Kerstin
  • Gruner, Hans Peter
  • Kiel, Alexandra
  • Schulte, Elisabeth

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-4FWSDH9-1/2/4d743ca68e47e829418e0357e3ff29b5
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 21 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 563-597

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:21:y:2005:i:3:p:563-597

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Doraszelski Ulrich & Gerardi Dino & Squintani Francesco, 2003. "Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-41, August.
  2. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1994. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1117, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Walsh, Carl E., 2003. "Comment on: The zero-interest-rate bound and the role of the exchange rate for monetary policy in Japan," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 1103-1108, July.
  4. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter, 2001. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 393-421, September.
  5. Ben-Yashar, Ruth C & Nitzan, Shmuel I, 1997. "The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 175-86, February.
  6. Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, 2003. "Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 24-44, April.
  7. César Martinelli, 2004. "Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000593, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Ilian Mihov & Anne Sibert, 2002. "Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees," Working Papers, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research 232002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  9. Faust, Jon, 1996. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 267-283, April.
  10. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2000. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 0341, Econometric Society.
  11. Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 259-294, November.
  12. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2008. "Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 655-683, May.
  13. Cesar Martinelli, 2000. "Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting," Working Papers, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM 0005, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  14. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-24, June.
  15. Karotkin, Drora & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1995. " Two Remarks on the Effect of Increased Equalitarianism in Decisional Skills on the Number of Individuals That Maximizes Group Judgmental Competence," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 307-11, December.
  16. Daniel Seidmann, 2011. "A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 49-74, January.
  17. Coenen, Günter & Wieland, Volker, 2003. "The zero-interest-rate bound and the role of the exchange rate for monetary policy in Japan," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank 0218, European Central Bank.
  18. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. "Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 451-70, June.
  19. Koh, Winston T. H., 1994. "Making decisions in committees a human fallibility approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 195-214, March.
  20. Mike Felgenhauer & Hans Peter Grüner, 2008. "Committees and Special Interests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 219-243, 04.
  21. Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, 2000. "Are Two Heads Better Than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decisionmaking," NBER Working Papers 7909, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Klaas J. Beniers & Otto H. Swank, 2003. "On the Composition of Committees," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-006/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  23. Seitz, Franz & Brand, Claus & Reimers, Hans-Eggert, 2003. "Forecasting real GDP: what role for narrow money?," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank 0254, European Central Bank.
  24. Milgrom, Paul R, 1979. "A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 679-88, May.
  25. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
  26. Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1982. "Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 289-97, June.
  27. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
  28. Mark Fey & Jaehoon Kim, 2002. "The Swing Voter's Curse: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1264-1268, September.
  29. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel Nitzan, 2001. "The invalidity of the Condorcet Jury Theorem under endogenous decisional skills," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 243-249, November.
  30. Piketty, Thomas, 1999. "The information-aggregation approach to political institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 791-800, April.
  31. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Jacob Paroush, 2001. "Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 737-746.
  32. Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra, 2004. "Collective decisions with interdependent valuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1147-1168, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:21:y:2005:i:3:p:563-597. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.