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Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first? Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Ottaviani, Marco
Sorensen, Peter
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics .
Volume (Year): 81 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 393-421
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:81:y:2001:i:3:p:393-421Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
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