Conversation, Information, and Herd Behavior
AbstractExperimental evidence shows that an important reason why people tend to imitate others, to exhibit "herd behavior" is that they assume that the others have information that justifies their actions. The information cascade models of Banerjee  and Bikhchandani et al.  are significant developments in showing some general equilibrium and welfare effects of such rational imitative behavior. But these models as specified may be of limited applicability since they assert that differences across groups in herd behavior can be attributed to the random decisions of first movers. Differences across groups in herd behavior might be explained more often in terms of different modes of interpersonal information transmission. Patterns of human conversation imply great selectivity to the kinds of information transmitted within groups.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1092.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1995
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Publication status: Published in Rhetoric and Economic Behavior (May 1995), 85(2): 181-185
Note: CFP 909.
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- Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817, August.
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