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Information Aggregation through Costly Political Action

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Author Info
Lohmann, Susanne
Abstract

Information about various policy alternatives is dispersed among the individual members of a society. Prior to a vote over the alternatives, some people take costly political action to signal their private information to voters. By informing voting decisions, political action has potential to decrease the likelihood that voters cast 'mistaken' votes. Perhaps surprisingly, preelection communication may be counterproductive. The dispersed information is partially aggregated by the vote and political action may contribute 'noise' to the voting process. In some cases, the voting mechanism is more likely to implement the full-information voting outcome in the absence of preelection political action. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 84 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 518-30
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:84:y:1994:i:3:p:518-30

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  1. Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, 2007. "Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 014, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
  2. Prat, Andrea, 1999. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 2152, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sorensen, 2002. "Professional Advice: The Theory of Reputational Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 02-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Laussel, Didier & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2007. "Should We Really Expect More from Our Friends?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6233, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Holm, Håkan, 2000. "Politically Correct Information Adoption," Working Papers 2000:5, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Christopher J. Ellis & John Fender, 2008. "Democratic Errors," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2008-2, University of Oregon Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  7. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 333-352, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2006. "A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations," CEPR Discussion Papers 5893, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2006. "Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 257-279, March. [Downloadable!]
  10. Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, 2004. "Neighborhood Information Exchange and Voter Participation: An Experimental Study," Working Paper Series in Economics 8, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 29 Sep 2004. [Downloadable!]
  11. Castanheira, Micael, 2002. "Why Vote for Losers?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3404, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Wallace HUFFMAN & Richard E. JUST, 1995. "Transaction Costs, Fads, And Politically Motivated Misdirection In Agricultural Research," Staff Papers 277, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Ryo Arawatari, 2009. "Informatization, voter turnout and income inequality," Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 29-54, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Richard Carson & Theodore Groves, 2007. "Incentive and informational properties of preference questions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(1), pages 181-210, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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