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Dynamic forecasting behavior by analysts: Theory and evidence

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  • Clarke, Jonathan
  • Subramanian, Ajay

Abstract

We examine the dynamic forecasting behavior of security analysts in response to their prior performance relative to their peers within a continuous time/multi-period framework. Our model predicts a U-shaped relationship between the boldness of an analyst's forecast, that is, the deviation of her forecast from the consensus and her prior relative performance. In other words, analysts who significantly out perform or under perform their peers issue bolder forecasts than intermediate performers. We then test these predictions of our model on observed analyst forecast data. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we document an approximately U-shaped relationship between analysts' prior relative performance and the deviation of their forecasts from the consensus. Our theory examines the impact of both explicit incentives in the form of compensation structures and implicit incentives in the form of career concerns, on the dynamic forecasting behavior of analysts. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, our results imply that analysts who face greater employment risk (that is, the risk of being fired for poor performance) have greater incentives to herd, that is, issue forecasts that deviate less from the consensus. Our multi-period model allows us to examine the dynamic forecasting behavior of analysts in contrast with the extant two-period models that are static in nature. Moreover, the model also differs significantly from existing theoretical models in that it does not rely on any specific assumptions regarding the existence of asymmetric information and/or differential analyst abilities.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 80 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 81-113

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:80:y:2006:i:1:p:81-113

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kempf, Alexander & Ruenzi, Stefan & Thiele, Tanja, 2009. "Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 92-108, April.
  2. Derann Hsu & Cheng-Huei Chiao, 2011. "Relative accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts over time: a Markov chain analysis," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 477-507, November.
  3. Hilary, Gilles & Hsu, Charles, 2011. "Endogenous overconfidence in managerial forecasts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 300-313, April.
  4. Bizer, Kilian & Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till & Spiwoks, Markus, 2014. "Strategic coordination in forecasting: An experimental study," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 195, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  5. Anne-Gael Vaubourg & Valdete Berisha-Krasniqui & Sébastien Galanti & Christophe Hurlin & Régis Breton, 2013. "We study whether financial analysts' concern for preserving good relationships with firms' managers motivates them to issue pessimistic or optimistic forecasts. Based on a dataset of one-yearahead EPS," Larefi Working Papers 1304, Larefi, Université Bordeaux 4.
  6. Citci, Haluk & Inci, Eren, 2012. "The Masquerade Ball of the CEOs and the Mask of Excessive Risk," MPRA Paper 35979, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Choi, Hyung Suk & Clarke, Jonathan & Ferris, Stephen P. & Jayaraman, Narayanan, 2009. "The effects of regulation on industry structure and trade generation in the US securities industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1434-1445, August.
  8. Ramnath, Sundaresh & Rock, Steve & Shane, Philip, 2008. "The financial analyst forecasting literature: A taxonomy with suggestions for further research," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 34-75.
  9. Nikolaos Theriou & George Mlekanis & Dimitrios Maditinos, 2011. "Herding the Mutual Fund Managers in the Athens Stock Exchange," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(4), pages 131-154.
  10. Jerry, Sun, 2011. "The Effect of Analyst Coverage on the Informativeness of Income Smoothing," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 333-349, September.
  11. Régis Breton & Sébastien Galanti & Christophe Hurlin & Anne-Gaël Vaubourg, 2013. "Does the firm-analyst relationship matter in explaining analysts' earnings forecast errors?," Working Papers hal-00862996, HAL.

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