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Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions

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Glazer, Jacob
Rubinstein, Ariel

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 79 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 157-173
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:79:y:1998:i:2:p:157-173

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-304, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Stephen Morris, 1999. "Political Correctness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1242, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Implementation and Preference for Honesty," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-244, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  5. Evans, R., 2006. "Mechanism Design with Renegotiation and Costly Messages," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0626, Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-254, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  7. Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Consensus building: How to persuade a group," PSE Working Papers 2006-19, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
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